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737 
ATONING FOR DRED SCOTT AND PLESSY WHILE 
SUBSTANTIALLY ABOLISHING THE DEATH PENALTY 
Scott W. Howe* 
Abstract: Has the Supreme Court adequately atoned for Dred Scott and Plessy? A Court 
majority has never confessed and apologized for the horrors associated with those decisions. 
And the horrors are so great that Dred Scott and Plessy have become the anti-canon of 
constitutional law. Given the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the Court’s historical 
complicity in the brutal campaign against African Americans, this Article contends that the 
Court could appropriately do more to atone. 
The Article asserts that the Court could profitably pursue atonement while abolishing 
capital punishment for aggravated murder. The Article shows why substantial abolition of the 
capital sanction would constitute a relevant response to the Court’s past complicity in the long, 
violent campaign for white supremacy. The Article also explains why substantial abolition, 
with a confession and apology, would involve little social cost and could send a 
valuable  message. 
As for how our racial history could help justify substantial abolition in the language of the 
Constitution, the Article proposes an approach suggested by decisions in which the Court has 
combined two or more clauses to justify an outcome that neither clause would authorize on its 
own. In the death-penalty context, the Court could aggregate the prohibition on cruel and 
unusual punishments and the command of equal protection. Under that approach, the Court 
need not find a national consensus against death-penalty systems, nor must it find purposeful 
discrimination. The Court could rely, instead, on the inability to refute that those systems are 
remnants of the judicially authorized pursuit of white supremacy. The nature of that conclusion 
would also distinguish death from other punishments and thereby solve some problems that 
the Court has identified with abolition using a single-clause methodology. 
The arguments for vigorous Supreme Court atonement and for limiting the death penalty 
connect, although they stand apart. The Court could look for a better context than the death 
penalty to apologize for Dred Scott and Plessy, but a better context is hard to fathom. Likewise, 
the Court could justify, without apology, restricting the penalty based on our judicially 
sanctioned quest for white supremacy, but an apology for Dred Scott and Plessy would add a 
healing message. The actions are synergistic. The Court could achieve something special 
through the mutually-reinforcing symbolism that could come with simultaneous restriction of 
the death sanction and robust atonement for Dred Scott and Plessy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
* Scott W. Howe. Frank L. Williams Professor of Criminal Law, Dale E. Fowler School of Law, 
Chapman University. I want to thank, without implicating, colleagues at the Chapman University 
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INTRODUCTION 
From early in the nineteenth century through well into the twentieth, 
the United States Supreme Court issued a series of opinions that 
undermined the efforts of African Americans to secure their physical 
protection, their dignity, and their progress.1 The Court decisions enabled 
the violent degradation of black persons2 and branded them as deeply 
inferior in a racial hierarchy favoring white supremacy.3 Primary 
examples include Dred Scott v. Sanford4 and Plessy v. Ferguson,5 which 
are widely viewed by historians and Supreme Court scholars as topping 
the list of the worst Supreme Court decisions ever rendered.6 Dred Scott 
and Plessy are so widely reviled that they constitute the core of 
constitutional law’s anti-canon, along with Lochner v. New York7 and, 
                                                   
1. See, e.g., LAWRENCE GOLDSTONE, INHERENTLY UNEQUAL: THE BETRAYAL OF EQUAL RIGHTS 
BY THE SUPREME COURT, 1865–1903, at 195–99 (2001) (discussing the complicity of the Supreme 
Court in the violent subjugation of black persons in the decades after the Civil War); F. MICHAEL 
HIGGINBOTHAM, GHOSTS OF JIM CROW: ENDING RACISM IN POST-RACIAL AMERICA 57–59 (2013) 
(discussing the negative effects of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott for even free black 
persons in the United States at the time); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 55–83 (1975) 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s participation in the subjugation of black persons from Dred Scott 
through Plessy, and concluding that “[b]y the close of the nineteenth century, . . . the Supreme Court 
had nullified nearly every vestige of the federal protection that had been cast like a comforting cloak 
over the Negro upon his release from bondage”); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF 
JIM CROW 53–54 (1955) (noting decisions of the Supreme Court between 1873 and 1898 that 
expressed a “weakening of resistance to racism”). 
2. See, e.g., GOLDSTONE, supra note 1, at 197 (asserting that Supreme Court decisions in the late 
19th century “proclaimed that the government of the United States” was “now firmly of the belief that 
the southern part of the Union could again confine the black man to chattel status”); Walter F. Pratt, 
Plessy v. Ferguson, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
739 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 2nd ed. 2005) (asserting that the “enduring effect” of the majority opinion 
“was to place the Court’s imprimatur on a considerably expanded field in which segregation was 
justified”); KLUGER, supra note 1, at 68 (asserting that, in part because the Supreme Court in the 
twenty years after the Civil War had “twisted” the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, it “should 
have surprised no one” when black men “began to be lynched”). 
3. See, e.g., HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 58 (“The ruling in Dred Scott affirmed that blacks, 
even free ones, were perceived to be both different from whites and inferior to whites.”); Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 562 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (asserting that the segregation law upheld 
by the majority was “a brand of servitude and degradation”). See also Charles L. Black, The 
Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 426 (1960) (asserting that the “court that 
refused to see inequality in” segregation in the South, as the Supreme Court did in Plessy, could only 
be acting “based on self-induced blindness, on flagrant contradiction of known fact”). 
4. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
5. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
6. See David G. Savage, How Did They Get It So Wrong?, ABA J. (Jan. 1, 2009), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/how_did_they_get_it_so_wrong 
[https://perma.cc/E6M7-GWD8]. 
7. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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perhaps, Korematsu v. United States8 at the perimeter.9 They are almost 
universally condemned today among law professors, lawyers, and judges 
as beyond the pale.10 
Given the extraordinary horrors associated with those decisions, this 
Article asks whether the Court has made adequate efforts to atone for 
them. The Court has never formally apologized for Dred Scott or for 
Plessy, although it began undermining Plessy at least by the time of Brown 
v. Board of Education,11 a case that falls, along with decisions such as 
Marbury v. Madison,12 at the core of constitutional law’s canon.13 Also, 
while the Court has taken steps in more modern times to try to protect 
racial minorities somewhat from harmful, racial discrimination, it has 
avoided explanations that would fully expose its own complicity in the 
long reign of white brutality.14 
Finding those efforts inadequate, this Article contends that the Court 
should do more to pursue redemption. The Article argues for: (1) a 
                                                   
8. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
9. See, e.g., Akhil Amar, Plessy v. Ferguson and the Anti-Canon, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 75, 76, 84 (2011) 
[hereinafter Amar, Plessy v. Ferguson] (asserting that “three court opinions occupy the lowest circle 
of constitutional hell,” which is the “anti-canon”: Dred Scott, Plessy, and Lochner; but suggesting 
that Korematsu may also qualify); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Thirteen Ways of Looking at 
Dred Scott, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 49, 76 (2007) (asserting that Dred Scott is “the key example” in 
the “anti-canon” of constitutional law); Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380, 
383 (2011) (asserting that Dred Scott, Plessy, Lochner, and Korematsu are the “anticanon” of 
American constitutional law, but noting that Korematsu is debatable); Richard A. Primus, Canon, 
Anti-Canon and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L. J. 243, 256–57 (1998) (asserting that the majority 
opinion in Dred Scott is “surely anti-canonical” and that the majority opinion in Plessy is also “anti-
canonical”).  
10. See Amar, Plessy v. Ferguson, supra note 9, at 77 (asserting that anti-canon cases exemplify 
“unwritten constitutionalism run amok”); Primus, supra note 9, at 254 n.41 (describing anti-canon 
constitutional texts as ones that we regard as “repulsive” and that have been rejected by canonical 
ones). See also Sanford Levinson, Is Dred Scott Really the Worst Opinion of All Time? Why Prigg Is 
Worse Than Dred Scott (But Is Likely to Stay Out of the “Anticanon”), 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 23, 23 
(2012) (“To embrace any of these cases as commendable, whether in the classroom, at the podium, 
or in a legal opinion, would be to reveal that one simply does not know ‘how to think’ as a modern 
constitutional lawyer. . . .”). 
11. 387 U.S. 483 (1954). See also CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: 
THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 109 (2016) (describing the Brown opinion, as in 
several death penalty cases, as having presented “a woefully incomplete picture of the underlying 
practice” of enforced segregation). 
12. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
13. See, e.g., Amar, Plessy v. Ferguson, supra note 9, at 76 (describing Marbury and Brown as part 
of “a constitutional canon”); Greene, supra note 9, at 381 (describing Brown as “a classic example” 
of a case belonging to “the constitutional canon”); Primus, supra note 9, at 257 (asserting that “Brown 
is a canonical decision”). 
14. For an example, see infra text at notes 270–277. 
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majority opinion containing a transparent confession of the Court’s 
historical errors; (2) a description of the associated harms to African 
Americans; (3) institutional apology; and (4) some further action to 
underscore the Court’s sincerity.15 The Article urges that there remains 
social value in seeking that sort of judicial expiation even after all of the 
Court’s past efforts to abandon Dred Scott and Plessy.16 Institutional 
purgation could help underscore the humanity of African Americans and 
confirm that the Court embraces their continuing quest for equality. That 
course could also encourage greater racial reconciliation17 by helping to 
“revitalize the public discourse on racial equality”18 and, ultimately, by 
promoting “a national reckoning that would lead to spiritual renewal.”19 
How could the Court begin to atone in such dramatic fashion so many 
years after Brown?  This Article advocates that the Court use as its vehicle 
the abolition of capital punishment for aggravated murder. Leading 
scholars have frequently contended that the modern use of the death 
penalty links to the long era of violent degradation of African 
Americans.20 The Article explores that idea and concludes that there are 
                                                   
15. See, e.g., MICHAEL E. DYSON, TEARS WE CANNOT STOP: A SERMON TO WHITE AMERICA 100–
05, 197 (2017) (calling for a true “owning up” for “the weight of white transgressions,” including 
Dred Scott and Plessy, with sincere apology). 
16. The Court’s failure openly to acknowledge and apologize still stains the social consciousness 
of many citizens who are well-informed about the Court’s history. See, e.g., JAMES H. CONE, THE 
CROSS AND THE LYNCHING TREE 38, 165–66 (2017) (lamenting the “1896 Supreme Court doctrine of 
‘separate but equal,’” and concluding that American must confront its history of white supremacy 
with repentance); id. (calling for acknowledgment of the errors and for an apology); see also HENRY 
LOUIS GATES, JR., STONY THE ROAD: RECONSTRUCTION, WHITE SUPREMACY, AND THE RISE OF JIM 
CROW 254 (2019) (asserting that “we in hindsight cannot help but be dismayed at the reversals 
signified by [among other acts] . . . the Supreme Court’s overturning of the Civil Rights Act of 
1875”); GOLDSTONE, supra note 1, at 195–99, 203 (characterizing the Court’s nineteenth-century 
decisions affecting the civil rights of black persons, including Dred Scott and Plessy, as a “Charade 
of Justice”). 
17. See, e.g., HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 220–21 (asserting the need for government to 
“acknowledge culpability” in the racism that continues to exist today and that “[a]wareness and 
contrition are important for an effective conversation” that can lead to “racial reconciliation”). 
18. Janine Young Kim, Racial Emotions and the Feeling of Equality, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 437, 439 (2016). 
19. Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC (June 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/ 
[https://perma.cc/EKS8-23CK] (emphasizing decades of racist housing policy). 
20. See, e.g., Stuart Banner, Traces of Slavery: Race and the Death Penalty in Historical 
Perspective, in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN 
AMERICA 96, 97 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., & Austin Sarat, eds., 2006) (“When we think about the 
death penalty, we think, in part, in race-tinged pictures—of black victims lynched by white mobs, of 
black defendants condemned by white juries, of slave codes and public hangings.”); EQUAL JUSTICE 
INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF RACIAL TERROR 64 (3d ed. 
2017) [hereinafter EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE’S REPORT ON LYNCHING] https://eji.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/10/lynching-in-america-3d-ed-080219.pdf [https://perma.cc/N63Q-8TKF] 
(noting that “regional data demonstrates that the modern death penalty in America mirrors racial 
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good grounds to believe that the death penalty for aggravated murder 
would not have survived had the long, judicially encouraged subjugation 
of African Americans never happened.21 On that view, abolition would 
constitute a relevant context for the Court to confess the horrors associated 
with its past complicity in the violent pursuit of white hegemony. Further, 
the violent subjugation of African Americans deserves recognition as one 
of the central byproducts of the claims of black inferiority and the 
segregation laws that the Court endorsed in Dred Scott and Plessy.22 
The Article also addresses cost-benefit questions and concludes that 
substantial abolition of the death penalty presents an unusually suitable 
opportunity for partial judicial expiation. Ending the death penalty for 
aggravated murder would involve little societal sacrifice.23 Indeed, an 
important question is whether abolishing it amounts to such a small 
sacrifice as to appear insignificant in an effort at apology. The sanction 
                                                   
violence of the past”); Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn, Capital Punishment as Legal Lynching?, in 
FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 21, 49 
(Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., & Austin Sarat, eds., 2006) (asserting that “the administration of capital 
punishment in the United States, like the practice of lynching, is one of the state practices by means 
of which the racial polity is reproduced”); BHARAT MALKANI, SLAVERY AND THE DEATH PENALTY: 
A STUDY IN ABOLITION 1 (2018) (“[I]t is widely recognized that capital punishment in the United 
States of America continues to be imbued with the legacy of slavery.”); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., 
Making Race Matter in Death Matters, in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND 
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 55, 61 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., & Austin Sarat, eds., 2006) (“The 
underlying currents involved in this sordid history—fear, white supremacy, devaluation of black life, 
hatred, and a desire to control—may not be exact reasons for the suspicious disparities in capital 
punishment today, but one cannot help but wonder whether some of the same impulses are at work.”); 
STEIKER & STEIKER, supra  note 11, at 111 (“Had the Court framed its constitutional regulation of 
capital punishment against the backdrop of antebellum codes, lynchings, mob-dominated trials, and 
disparate enforcement patterns, the Court would have done a much better job of explaining why the 
American death penalty deserved the sustained attention of the American judiciary.” (emphasis in 
original)); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 122 
(2003) (“The states and the region where lynching was dominant show clear domination of recent 
executions, while those states with very low historic lynching records are much less likely than 
average to have either a death penalty or executions late in the twentieth century.”); John D. Bessler, 
What I Think About When I Think About the Death Penalty, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L. REV. 781, 791 (2018) 
(“The death penalty has long been associated with the institution of slavery and with rampant 
discrimination.”); Stephen Bright, Discrimination, Death, and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial 
Discrimination in the Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 439 (1995) (“The 
death penalty is a direct descendent of lynching and other forms of racial violence and racial 
oppression in America.”); Phyllis Goldfarb, Matters of Strata: Race, Gender, and Class Structures in 
Capital Cases, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1409 (2016) (“When Southern states turned away from 
lynching in the twentieth century, . . . we can find examples of officials calling off would-be lynch 
mobs by implicitly promising capital punishment as law’s alternative route to a parallel outcome.”).. 
21. See infra notes 401–404 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra notes 201–233 and accompanying text. 
23. See infra notes 414–432 and accompanying text. 
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today is carried out so rarely and haphazardly, and so long after the crime, 
that it could hardly have much marginal crime-deterrent value over 
perpetual imprisonment.24 Its marginal retributive value is also modest at 
best and tainted by the racial prejudice that infests it.25 The penalty 
functions primarily as a symbol.26 Yet for many who are most troubled by 
our racial history it is a symbol of the legacy of a barbarous pursuit of 
white supremacy,27 which is why judicial abolition of its use in aggravated 
murder cases could serve as partial judicial atonement for Dred Scott 
and Plessy. 
As for how history could help justify abolition in the language of the 
Constitution, the Article proposes an approach that is novel in death-
penalty jurisprudence but that the Court has occasionally employed in 
other areas of constitutional law. This methodology involves combining 
clauses to justify a protection that no single clause would authorize on its 
own. While the Court has not commonly recognized multiple-clause 
rights, it has done so often enough to make the idea plausible in the death-
penalty context.28  Most recently, in Obergefell v. Hodges,29 the Court 
noted a “synergy”30 between the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses that it said had helped justify its previous recognition of several 
protections and, in the case at hand, its recognition of a right to same-sex 
marriage.31 Another example is Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,32 in which 
the Court combined the First Amendment rights to free speech and to 
association to justify a right of “expressive association” that the Court said 
allowed the Boy Scouts to exclude gay men from adult membership.33 
                                                   
24. See infra notes 425–432 and accompanying text. 
25. See infra notes 421–423 and accompanying text. 
26. See Scott W. Howe, Capital-Sentencing Law and the New Conservative Court, 2018 CARDOZO L. 
REV. DE NOVO 157, 171 (asserting that for some, it represents “white supremacy”—“a history of racial 
oppression and savagery” while, for others, it represents “the idea that . . . we might get what we deserve”).  
27. See, e.g., CONE, supra note 16, at 163 (“Nothing is more racist in America’s criminal justice 
system than its administration of the death penalty[, which] . . . is why the term ‘legal lynching’ is 
still relevant today.” (footnotes omitted)); JESSE L. JACKSON, SR., JESSE L. JACKSON, JR., & BRUCE 
SHAPIRO, LEGAL LYNCHING 72 (2001) (“Yet, there is a special relationship between the death penalty 
and African-Americans, a relationship going back to antebellum days, when the gallows was a 
principle means of punishing slaves, and on through the worst years of Jim Crow.”). 
28. For some instances in which the Court has employed the doctrine, see Scott W. Howe, Constitution 
Clause Aggregation and the Marijuana Crimes, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 779, 830–44 (2018). 
29. 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
30. Id. at 2603. 
31. See id. at 2602–03 (concluding that the right of same-sex couples to marry “that is part of the 
liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that Amendment’s guarantee of 
the equal protection of the laws”). 
32. 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000). 
33. See id. at 648–53 (“Forcing a group to accept certain members may impair the ability of the 
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Regarding capital punishment, the Court could combine the equal 
protection command and the prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishments to support abolition, although neither alone, according to the 
Court, can support that outcome.34 Under this approach, the Court need 
not find that such systems reflect purposeful discrimination—as required 
by the equal protection clause—or that a national consensus against death-
penalty systems already exists—as required by the cruel and unusual 
punishment prohibition. It could be enough to hold that we cannot refute 
that those systems are remnants of the judicially legitimized pursuit of 
white supremacy. Given our understanding of the illegitimacy of state 
efforts to enforce the racial hierarchy and of Dred Scott and Plessy, the 
Court would appropriately resolve doubts over whether the death penalty 
would still exist had those wrongs never happened, in favor of abolition.35 
The nature of such a conclusion would also help distinguish death from 
other punishments and thereby solve some problems that the Court has 
identified with abolition using a single-clause methodology.36 This 
approach can justify substantial abolition of the death sanction whether or 
not the Court apologizes for its historical role in promoting the “color-
line”37 and for the associated harms. However, as part of an atonement 
effort, the Court could also offer a forceful apology. 
The Article does not advocate complete judicial abolition of the death 
penalty, which avoids a separate problem based on constitutional text. The 
argument for abolition based on the nation’s inglorious quest for white 
supremacy need not apply to capital punishment for extraordinary crimes 
against the state, including “treason, espionage, terrorism, and drug 
kingpin activity.”38 There is no equivalent argument that those offenses 
are associated with the discriminatory abuse of African Americans or the 
maintenance of a white-dominated, racial hierarchy.39 Consistent with that 
view, the Article makes the case for abolition only in cases of crime 
                                                   
group to express those views, and only those views, that it intends to express.”). 
34. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987) (rejecting separate challenges to the 
Georgia death-sentencing system brought under the Equal Protection and Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clauses).  
35. Death sentences have become increasingly uncommon since the 1990s. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. 
CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 3 (2019), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q3GA-ZX9D] (revealing that annual death sentences dropped from 295 in 1998 to 42 in 
2018). 
36. See infra notes 479–481 and accompanying text. 
37. W. E. B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 11 (Univ. of N.C. Press 2013) (1903). 
38. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 437 (2008). 
39. For the evidence of such racialized use of the sanction in crimes against individuals, see infra 
text at notes 373–31. 
 
10 Howe.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/20  11:47 PM 
2020] DRED SCOTT, PLESSY, AND THE DEATH PENALTY 745 
 
against individual persons, particularly aggravated murder,40 the only 
offense against individuals for which the Court has continued to allow the 
death penalty.41 Because the sanction could continue to apply 
constitutionally to some extraordinary crimes against the state, there 
would be no contravention of the language in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments that contemplates the possibility of capital punishment in 
unspecified circumstances.42 
The Article proceeds in five stages. Part II describes how the Supreme 
Court participated in the decades-long degradation and brutalization of 
African Americans through a series of opinions, particularly in Dred Scott 
and Plessy. Part III describes how the Court later failed to atone according 
to a standard that calls for transparent confession and apology. Part IV 
overcomes various possible objections to judicial atonement that allege, 
for example, that Dred Scott and Plessy were not wrong when rendered,43 
that the decisions did not materially contribute to black oppression, or that 
confession and apology would risk fostering unproductive illusions of 
white redemption and black power by acknowledging and responding to 
black victimization. Part V explains why, in pursuit of Supreme Court 
expiation, abolition of the death penalty for aggravated murder is a 
relevant, partial measure and, indeed, why that course would respond to 
the punishment’s historical symbiosis with the color-line even were the 
Court not to apologize for Dred Scott and Plessy. Finally, Part VI explains 
the benefits of a dual-clause theory to reject the death penalty and pursue 
atonement for our history of Court-endorsed racial oppression. 
                                                   
40. This formulation also leaves open that certain murders, such as the assassination of certain 
government employees or murders associated with political terrorism, could remain punishable by 
the death penalty.  
41. In rejecting the death penalty for child-rape and other non-homicidal crimes against individuals, 
the Kennedy majority asserted that, “in determining whether the death penalty is excessive, there is a 
distinction between intentional first-degree murder on the one hand and nonhomicide crimes against 
individual persons, even including child rape, on the other.” Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 438. 
42. The Fifth Amendment provides in part that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, 
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The 
Fourteenth Amendment provides in part that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law. . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
43. See, e.g., MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 28 
(2006) (“Taney’s constitutional claims in Dred Scott were well within the mainstream of antebellum 
constitutional thought.”); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 9 (2004) (“Plessy-era race decisions were 
plausible interpretations of conventional legal sources: text, original intent, precedent, and custom.”). 
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I. THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL ATONEMENT: SUPREME COURT 
COMPLICITY IN THE DEGRADATION OF BLACK PERSONS 
As a historical matter, the Supreme Court has treated black people 
horribly and even inhumanely.44  From before the Civil War through well 
into the twentieth century, the Supreme Court largely, although not 
entirely, abjured from efforts to describe the Constitution as safeguarding 
them.45 In the antebellum era, the Court sometimes unnecessarily found 
implied rights for slave owners and a lack of rights for blacks46 in part out 
of an effort to appease the slaveholding interests concentrated in the 
South.47 From that period, the most infamous of the rulings was Dred 
Scott.48 In the postbellum era through the early twentieth century, the 
Court gave a few narrow rulings for African Americans,49 but generally 
                                                   
44. See infra notes 52–195 and accompanying text. 
45. For discussion of some decisions by the Court during the 1800s that were favorable to black 
persons, see infra notes 153–162 and accompanying text. 
46. See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, The Supreme Court 1999 Term; Foreword: The Document and the 
Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 65 (2000) [hereinafter Amar, The Supreme Court] (asserting that 
“[t]he Philadelphia Constitution was pro-slavery, but the Taney Court was far worse, and grossly 
dismissive of the rights of free blacks”).  
47. From the end of the eighteenth century through the Civil War, the importance of slavery to the 
economic interests of the southern states and to the nation as a whole was tied largely to the production 
of cotton, which Eli Whitney’s invention of the cotton gin had greatly stimulated. See IRA BERLIN, 
MANY THOUSANDS GONE: THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES OF SLAVERY IN NORTH AMERICA 307, 359–
60 (1998); JOHN H. FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY 
OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 100 (8th ed. 2001). “For most of the period before the Civil War, the United 
States was the source of close to 80 percent of the cotton imported by British manufacturers.” WALTER 
JOHNSON, RIVER OF DARK DREAMS: SLAVERY AND EMPIRE IN THE COTTON KINGDOM 10 (2013). The 
economic interest to the southern states but northern states as well in maintaining slavery to produce 
cotton was substantiated in an 1832 U.S. government document revealing “that cotton not only 
dominated US exports and the financial sector but also drove the expansion of northern industry.” 
EDWARD E. BAPTIST, THE HALF HAS NEVER BEEN TOLD: SLAVERY AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN 
CAPITALISM 273 (2014). “By the middle of the century southern masters ruled over the wealthiest and 
most dynamic slave society the world had ever known.” MATTHEW KARP, THIS VAST SOUTHERN 
EMPIRE: SLAVEHOLDERS AT THE HELM OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 2 (2016). Corresponding with 
increasing demand for labor in the “Cotton Kingdom,” the “number of American slaves increased 
from 1.5 million in 1820 to nearly 4 million in 1860.” DAVID B. DAVIS, INHUMAN BONDAGE: THE 
RISE AND FALL OF SLAVERY IN THE NEW WORLD 182 (2006). By 1860, “prime field hands were 
selling for $1,000 in Virginia and $1,800 in New Orleans.” FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra at 134. 
48. See ERIC FONER, THE FIERY TRIAL: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND AMERICAN SLAVERY 93 (2010) 
(concurring that it was “[t]he most important decision” ever rendered by the Supreme Court and one 
that damned Taney to enduring fame).  
49. See, e.g., KLUGER, supra note 1, at 64, 83 (asserting that “three jury cases added up to a 
gain . . . in rhetoric” for blacks, but concluding that “[b]y the close of the nineteenth century,” the 
Supreme Court had neutered almost all of the federal protection that the Reconstruction Amendments 
had conferred on blacks); Amar, The Supreme Court, supra note 46, at 70–71 (contending that, after 
the Civil War, the Court failed to faithfully interpret the “Constitution’s new enforcement clauses,” 
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ruled so as to allow their continued subjugation.50 The most infamous such 
ruling of that era was Plessy.51 
A. The Antebellum Period: Dred Scott 
Dred Scott was not the only decision of the Court in the antebellum 
period that zealously protected the rights of slave owners,52 but it was 
among the most extreme in promoting slavery and the most explicitly 
degrading toward humans of African descent.53 That is perhaps why 
American legal and constitutional scholars commonly view it today as 
“almost certainly the worst judicial ruling in American constitutional 
history.”54 The explanation for the Court’s extremism was more 
complicated than simply a total antipathy toward blacks. In another 
decision from that era, United States v. The Amistad,55 the Court—
including its several southern members56—voted to free numerous black 
Africans carried on a Spanish ship by Spanish slave traders in violation of 
Spanish laws that arrived, after an uprising, off of Long Island.57 Scholars 
suspect that key to the ruling was that The Amistad did not involve 
demands for accommodation of important slave interests in the 
United  States.58 
Other decisions of that era that implicated the slavery concerns of 
southern states consistently “represented victories for those who favored 
sectional accommodation.”59 Considered with the ruling in The Amistad, 
those outcomes suggest that a misguided quest by the Court to avoid 
                                                   
and essentially disregarded much of the core meanings of the Reconstruction Amendments). 
50. See, e.g., WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 53–54 (asserting that the Court “was engaged in a bit 
of reconciliation” achieved at the expense of black people). 
51. See Cheryl I. Harris, The Story of Plessy v. Ferguson: The Death and Resurrection of Racial 
Formalism, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 181, 181 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004) (noting that 
Plessy “is often denounced as a judicial travesty on par with Dred Scott”). 
52. See, e.g., Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859); Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 
How.) 82 (1851); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 
Wheat.) 66 (1825). 
53. See infra notes 120–128 and accompanying text. 
54. Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Story of Dred Scott: Originalism’s Forgotten Past, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 151, 151 (Michael C. Dorf, ed., 2004). See also Walter Ehrlich, Scott 
v. Sandford, in OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 761 (Kermit 
L. Hall, ed., 1992) (asserting that American legal and constitutional scholars “consider the Dred Scott 
decision to be the worst ever rendered by the Supreme Court”).  
55. 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518 (1841). 
56. See EARL M. MALTZ, SLAVERY AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1825–61, 114 (2009). 
57. See id. 
58. See id.  
59. Id. 
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dissolution of the Union, should slave owners and others who benefited 
from slavery not feel sufficiently appeased,60 also operated in some way 
behind the stated reasons in the pro-slavery decisions.61 Yet, while Chief 
Justice Taney’s pro-slavery opinion for the Court in Dred Scott also may 
have rested in some sense on that rationale,62 it remained unusually 
transparent among Supreme Court edicts in advocating white hegemony. 
None of the other pro-slavery decisions reached the extremes of Taney’s 
explicit abasement of blacks and their lack of legal protections against 
white domination.63 
The Dred Scott case concerned a slave who had originally sued his 
nominal white owner for his freedom in Missouri state court.64 Missouri 
had been admitted to the Union in 1821 as a slave state under the Missouri 
Compromise of 1820,65 through which Maine was to enter as a free state 
(thus maintaining the balance between slave and free states) and all land 
north of 36˚ 30’ not located within Missouri was to remain forever free.66 
Dred Scott claimed that because a former owner had taken him to reside 
for a half-dozen years67 in the free state of Illinois and then to Fort 
Snelling, in federal territory that is now Minnesota, where slavery was 
banned, he could not be re-enslaved when returned to Missouri.68 The 
legal consequences seemingly would have differed if Scott had absconded 
to a free jurisdiction, because he would have then risked recapture and 
return under the Constitution’s Fugitive Slave Clause69 and under federal 
                                                   
60. See, e.g., William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial 
Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513, 539 (1974) (asserting, for example, 
that the Prigg decision “rested on an instrumentalist concern for national unity”). 
61. Industry in northern states in the decades before the Civil War was also greatly spurred by the cotton 
production in the South, which was, in turn, enabled by slavery. See BAPTIST, supra note 47, at 317. 
62. See GRABER, supra note 43, at 13 (“In Dred Scott, the Supreme Court fostered sectional 
moderation by replacing the original Constitution’s failing political protections for slavery with 
legally enforceable protections acceptable to Jacksonians in the free and slave states.”). 
63. See, e.g., HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 58 (“Dred Scott’s legacy lies in the Supreme Court’s 
determination that blacks, whether slave or free, were not citizens, and therefore were not entitled to 
constitutional protection.”). 
64. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW 
AND POLITICS 250–53 (1978). 
65. See LORENZO J. GREENE, GARY R KREMER & ANTONIO F. HOLLAND, MISSOURI’S BLACK 
HERITAGE 23–24 (rev. ed. 1993). 
66. See id.; FEHRENBACHER, supra note 64, at 107–13. 
67. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 64, at 242–45. 
68. See EARL M. MALTZ, DRED SCOTT AND THE POLITICS OF SLAVERY 63–64 (2007). 
69. “No person held to service or labour in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, 
in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labour, but shall be 
delivered upon claim of the party to whom such service or labour may be due.” U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.  
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legislation.70 However, the Missouri courts had “consistently held” that 
residence in a free jurisdiction “for even a short period” with the owner’s 
permission could “effectively prevent the reattachment of the status of 
slavery when the former slave returned to Missouri.”71 That view 
accorded with a widely-adopted nineteenth century common-law 
doctrine.72 Yet, despite those precedents, the Missouri Supreme Court 
ruled two-to-one against Scott, concluding that where—after residence in 
a free jurisdiction—a slave’s return to Missouri was voluntary, 
reattachment would apply.73 
Rather than appeal directly to the United States Supreme Court, Scott’s 
lawyers instituted a new suit in federal court alleging common-law claims 
and jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, asserting that Scott was 
a citizen of Missouri and his nominal owner was a citizen of New York.74 
His claims in state court had rested on the common law of Missouri, not 
the Constitution or a federal statute.75 In another case involving a slave 
claiming his freedom, Strader v. Graham,76 the Supreme Court had 
declared itself without authority to overturn a state supreme court’s 
declaration as to the common law of the state.77 Also, in that era,78 Swift 
v. Tyson79 arguably allowed federal courts resolving a diversity action 
based on the common law to decide independently on the governing 
rule.80 Yet Scott lost after trial when the federal circuit judge hearing the 
case, Robert Wells, followed the reasoning of the Missouri Supreme Court 
and held that Scott remained a slave in Missouri.81 Scott’s case then 
proceeded to the United States Supreme Court.82 
                                                   
70. See Eisgruber, supra note 54, at 153. 
71. MALTZ, supra note 56, at 212. See also Eisgruber, supra note 54, at 153 (noting the legal 
difference between a slave that absconded versus one that resided in a free jurisdiction with the 
owner’s permission). 
72. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 64, at 50–61. British precedents also favored Dred Scott’s 
position. See MALTZ, supra note 68, at 64. 
73. See MALTZ, supra note 68, at 66–70. 
74. See Eisgruber, supra note 54, at 155. 
75. See MALTZ, supra note 68, at 71. 
76. 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1851). 
77. See id. at 94. 
78. The rule was changed in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
79. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
80. See MALTZ, supra note 68, at 71. 
81. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 64, at 276–80. 
82. See Eisgruber, supra note 54, at 156. 
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The high court ruled against Scott, seven-to-two.83 The official reporter 
declared Chief Justice Taney’s opinion as “of the Court,”84 and Taney 
rejected Scott’s appeal on multiple grounds.85  Each of the other eight 
justices wrote separately, and there has been substantial controversy over 
whether a majority agreed with all of Taney’s rulings.86 However, a search 
for explicit disagreement with Taney’s opinion by the other justices 
reveals that “none of the major rulings in Taney’s opinion can be pushed 
aside as unauthoritative.”87 Indeed, the “common convention” has been to 
accept Taney’s opinion as providing the rulings of the Court.88 
Despite widespread support for slavery at the time, the Court could 
have ruled for Scott.89 Although against the prevailing view of that era, as 
Michael Higginbotham notes, the Court could have concluded, “on the 
basis of precedent, that Scott, as a free person, had rights and privileges 
just like whites.”90 We should not forget that there were hundreds of  
thousands of free black persons living in the United States at that point.91 
And, while the original Constitution contained “no less than ten clauses” 
that “directly or indirectly accommodated” slavery,92 none of them said 
anything about the rights of free black persons.93 
Moreover, if the Court was not going to rule for Scott,94 it could simply 
have affirmed the ruling of Judge Wells that the issue was one of local 
                                                   
83. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 64, at 322. 
84. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 399 (1856). 
85. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 64, at 323. 
86. See id. at 324–33. 
87. Id. at 333. 
88. Eisgruber, supra note 54, at 157. See also FEHRENBACHER, supra note 64, at 334 (“As a matter 
of historical reality, the Court decided what Taney declared that it decided.”). 
89. Even apart from the ruling against Scott, several of Taney’s pronouncements about slavery and 
the status of black persons were widely and deeply disturbing even in the antebellum era. See infra 
text at notes 95–128; see also STEPHEN R. OATES, WITH MALICE TOWARD NONE: A LIFE OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 131–32 (1977) (noting that the decision “shocked Republicans everywhere” and 
that they “set about mobilizing Northern opinion against it,” including by arguing that it conflicted 
with Democratic presidential candidate Stephen Douglas’s doctrine of “popular sovereignty” 
regarding slavery). 
90. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 59.  
91. See, e.g., Erin Bradford, Free African American Population in the U.S.: 1790–1860, NCPEDIA 
(2008), https://www.ncpedia.org/sites/default/files/census_stats_1790-1860.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J6WM-EAPS] (reporting, based on census data, a total of 476,748 free African 
Americans residing in the U.S. in 1860). 
92. WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 
1760–1848, 62 (1977).  
93. See id. at 62–63 (quoting the ten clauses). 
94. On this score, see GRABER, supra note 43, at 28–29 (“The judicial denial of black citizenship reflected 
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property law and that Scott remained a slave under the common law of 
Missouri, as determined by the Missouri Supreme Court.95 On that basis, 
the Court could have declared that, assuming Scott could bring a suit in 
federal court, he could not win on the merits, because Missouri common 
law controlled. On that same basis, assuming the Court wanted to resolve 
the case on jurisdictional grounds, Taney could have said that diverse 
citizenship was lacking, because Scott was a slave and not a citizen in 
Missouri. Instead, Taney reached out “to settle issues far beyond the 
dictates of judicial restraint,”96 and, in doing so, acted unwisely.97 
Taney unnecessarily pronounced that Congress had no power to restrict 
slavery in the territories, such as it purported to do in the Missouri 
Compromise, and, for that reason, Scott had not become a free man during 
his time at Fort Snelling.98 The reasoning given was verbose,99 but 
concluded with the idea that a slave owner had a substantive due process 
right to take a slave to reside in free jurisdictions without losing 
ownership.100 Taney “said nothing to justify use of the due-process clause 
as a restraint upon legislative power—that is, as a limitation upon the 
substance of law and not merely upon the manner of its enforcement.”101 
More importantly, he invoked this methodology “to produce a profoundly 
immoral decision.”102 He ignored that the due process clause extended its 
“liberty” protection to every “person” in the country,103 and that even 
                                                   
beliefs held by the overwhelming majority of antebellum jurists  in both the North and the South.”). 
95. See HOWARD N. MEYER, THE AMENDMENT THAT REFUSED TO DIE 19 (2000); see also 
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 64, at 324 (noting that seven justices agreed that the law of Missouri 
determined Dred Scott’s slave status when he had returned there). 
96. KLUGER, supra note 1, at 55. 
97. See, e.g., FEHRENBACHER, supra note 64, at 335–36; (asserting that “there has always been 
a . . . conviction that the Dred Scott decision was egregiously wrong or at least exceedingly unwise”); 
GRABER, supra note 43, at 56 (asserting that Taney “overreached” by claiming that “the African race 
never have been acknowledged as belonging to the family of nations” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Herbert Storing, Slavery and the Moral Foundations of the American Republic, in TOWARD 
A MORE PERFECT UNION: WRITINGS OF HERBERT J. STORING 131, 134 (Joseph M. Bessette ed., 1995) 
(asserting that Taney’s argument that the founders viewed black persons as without rights was a “gross 
calumny,” because the founders generally understood that blacks were persons “endowed with 
unalienable rights,” and “the injustice of slavery was very generally acknowledged”).  
98. See, e.g., Amar, The Supreme Court, supra note 46, at 70 (rejecting as “absurd” Taney’s view 
that the Constitution disallowed “federal laws excluding slavery from various federal territories”). 
99. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 64, at 379 (noting that Taney used nineteen pages to say something 
he could have said in a few sentences—that the Bill of Rights was operative in the territories). 
100. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 452 (1857). 
101. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 64, at 382. 
102. Eisgruber, supra note 54, at 180. But, cf., GRABER, supra note 43, at 83 (“Slavery was 
embedded in a way of life that most Southerners and some Northerners thought intrinsically valuable 
and expressive of the highest constitutional aspirations.”).  
103. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty or property, 
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slaves were “persons” according to the Constitution,104 which suggested 
that they had competing due process rights that protected their liberty.105 
Acknowledging that point meant at least that slaves were not plausibly 
viewed merely as “property in the same sense that hogs and horses” 
were.106 Taney was also undeterred by the unavoidable realization that 
declaring Congress to lack power to “exclude slavery from the territories” 
would outrage many in the North by undermining the Republican party’s 
“antiextensionist” platform and by limiting Democrat Stephen Douglas’s 
“‘much vaunted’ doctrine of popular sovereignty.”107 
If Taney’s opinion had done no more, it would have remained incendiary 
in its time,108 but it might not have ended up in the anti-canon of constitutional 
law. After all, there were other Supreme Court opinions from that era that 
fanatically promoted slavery interests but that never achieved Dred Scott’s 
enduring and widespread infamy.109 One example, also appalling, is Prigg v. 
Pennsylvania,110 in which the Court nullified the “personal liberty” laws of 
free states like Pennsylvania to enable slave hunters to kidnap black 
persons—even children who could not plausibly be slaves—from free to 
slave states on the mere claim that they were fugitive slaves.111 In theory, 
upon their delivery to a slave state, free blacks erroneously seized could still 
                                                   
without due process of law . . . .”).  
104. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the 
several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which 
shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to a 
Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.”). 
105. To avoid this point, Taney “consistently spoke of the rights of ‘citizens’ in the territories, 
rather than the rights of ‘persons’ there.” FEHRENBACHER, supra note 64, at 382. 
106. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, II COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 245 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
Despite the violence, degradation and deprivation that slavery imposed on its victims, “it was the 
lasting contribution of slaves to create an artistic yield that matched their enormous gift of labor, in 
tobacco and cotton, to the American economy.” STERLING STUCKEY, SLAVE CULTURE: NATIONALIST 
THEORY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF BLACK AMERICA, at xxiii (25th anniversary ed., 2013).  
107. OATES, supra note 89, at 131–32.  
108. See id. While Dred Scott immediately infuriated Republicans, “the racist and proslavery 
principles” that Taney relied on “had strong roots in both the Constitution and the American political 
tradition.” GRABER, supra note 43, at 76. “For Southern Jacksonian jurists during the mid-nineteenth 
century, [constitutional] values included both slavery and white supremacy.” Id. 
109. See, e.g., Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 526 (1859) (upholding a federal, fugitive 
slave statute under which an alleged fugitive slave who claimed mistaken identity could not testify 
and was subject to a juryless proceeding in which the magistrate would receive ten dollars for a ruling 
for the slave catcher but only five dollars for a ruling for the black person). See also Amar, The 
Supreme Court, supra note 46, at 70 (describing the statute in question and concluding that it was a 
“constitutional travesty,” although the Court in Ableman declared it constitutional).  
110. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
111. See Levinson, supra note 10, at 29–30 (explaining the effect of Prigg). 
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sue for their freedom in the courts of the slave state,112 and a slave catcher 
could also be criminally liable there “for kidnapping a free man.”113 Yet many 
blacks lacked the resources and ability to sue, and few “could rebut the 
presumption against freedom with appropriate documentation or witness 
testimony.”114 As for slave hunters facing kidnapping charges, they “were 
rarely if ever prosecuted for pretextually seizing free blacks.”115 Therefore, 
Prigg in many circumstances encouraged whites to kidnap free blacks to try 
to enslave them.116 Sanford Levinson has concluded that Prigg was “worse” 
than Dred Scott regarding the immediate effect on free blacks.117 
Nonetheless, Prigg is not part of the anti-canon.118 Part of the reason, perhaps, 
is that Prigg did not openly and repeatedly degrade black people by declaring 
them inherently and profoundly inferior.119 
Unlike in Prigg, Taney’s Dred Scott opinion explicitly pronounced that all 
blacks who were slaves or born in the United States120 were naturally 
subjugated to white men and unworthy of citizenship. These insults may have 
given the opinion its enduring infamy.121 He pronounced that blacks, 
compared to whites, were lesser beings by so much that they were, in 
constitutional terms, closer to livestock.122 Indeed, he wrote that blacks were 
“so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to 
respect.”123 Without data, he asserted universal agreement among civilized 
persons that blacks were lesser beings.124 His opinion offered “twenty-one 
                                                   
112. See MALTZ, supra note 56, at 111. 
113. Id. at 110. 
114. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 54. 
115. MALTZ, supra note 56, at 110. 
116. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 54 (asserting that “Prigg provided an invitation for 
whites to kidnap free blacks”); MALTZ, supra note 56, at 111 (noting that the federal statute that the 
Court found to preempt the Pennsylvania statute in Prigg “placed free blacks at risk”). 
117. See Levinson, supra note 10, at 29–30; see also Greene, supra note 9, at 428 (asserting that 
Prigg “could easily be called the worst Supreme Court decision ever issued”). 
118. See Greene, supra note 9, at 383.  
119. Sanford Levinson has asked whether part of the explanation may be the status of Justice Story, 
Prigg’s author, as “probably the major legal figure of the American republic prior to the Civil War,” 
buttressed by Story’s role as the first Dane Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. See Levinson, 
supra note 10, at 31. 
120. Technically, “Taney did not reject black citizenship per se,” because the “only persons Dred 
Scott declared permanently ineligible for citizenship were free blacks and slaves born in the United 
States.” GRABER, supra note 43, at 20. 
121. See, e.g., Amar, The Supreme Court, supra note 46, at 70 (rejecting as “absurd” Taney’s 
“proclamation that free blacks could never be citizens”). 
122. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 451 (1857) (asserting that the Constitution “makes no 
distinction” between “the right of property of the master in a slave” and “other property owned by a citizen”). 
123. Id. at 407. 
124. See id. at 407–09. 
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references to blacks as inferior and whites as superior.”125 The highest court 
of the United States thereby explicitly endorsed the virulently “racist 
doctrine”126 that black people were essentially sub-human, worthy of no 
better than slavery.127 The level of enduring harm to African Americans from 
those pronouncements has been incalculable.128 
B. The Postbellum Period: Plessy 
After the Civil War, the Reconstruction Amendments to the 
Constitution129 along with new federal legislation protecting civil rights130 
                                                   
125. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 59. 
126. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 64, at 582. 
127. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 59 (asserting that the opinion conveyed that “[s]lavery 
was the appropriate place for such inferior beings”). 
128. For argument that the 1954 decision in Brown “erased Dred Scott” by making African Americans, in the 
eyes of the law, “[n]o longer ‘beings of an inferior race,’” see United States v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 
836, 873 (5th Cir. 1966). 
Consider, however, the moving account of an African American, Justice Clarence Thomas, about driving with 
his young wife and baby son in an old, foreign car from Yale University to Savannah, Georgia, in 1973, for summer 
employment after his second year of law school. See CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON 81 (2007). 
“The prospect of driving through the South frightened me, with good reason,” he reported. Id. at 81. Indeed, as soon 
the couple crossed into North Carolina, they saw a billboard that read: “The United Klans of America Welcome 
You.” Id. Unfortunately, they soon had car trouble. Id. Thomas was “sick with worry,” presumably because he 
knew the law could not provide him and his family with equal protection. Id.  After many problems and a “bad 
night’s sleep” in a motel that would put them up, the car failed as they pulled into a gas station in a small town in 
South Carolina. Id. at _. Fortunately, the owner helped them. Id.  He was African American. See id. 
129. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments “were designed to give Congress 
broad powers to protect civil rights and civil liberties” and together “form Congress’s Reconstruction 
Power.” Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801, 1805 (2010). The 
Thirteenth Amendment was passed by Congress in January 1865 and ratified by the states in 
December 1865; the Fourteenth Amendment was passed by Congress in June 1866 and ratified by the 
states in June 1868; and the Fifteenth Amendment was passed by Congress in February 1869 and 
ratified by the states in February 1870. See id. at 1808 n.27. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibited 
“slavery” and “involuntary servitude,” except “as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have 
been duly convicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment declared that “[a]ll 
persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of 
the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. It also declared, 
inter alia, that “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.” Id. The Fifteenth Amendment mandated that the “right of citizens of the 
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account 
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. Each of these 
amendments contained an enforcement clause: “Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment,” the language of which in 
each case is “virtually identical, giving Congress the ‘power to enforce’ the provisions of the 
amendment ‘by appropriate legislation.’” Balkin, supra note 129, at 1808.  
130. Congress passed numerous statutes during Reconstruction that aimed to protect black citizens. 
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reflected an effort to atone for the prior mistreatment of blacks, but the 
doctrine of the Supreme Court was less contrite.131 The Court often did 
not live up to its purported role to “do justice, free, as far as the lot of 
humanity admits, from party passion or political expediency.”132 Instead, 
the postbellum Court played a central role in the “long nightmare of 
disenfranchisement, segregation, and racial violence”133 that followed the 
formal end of Reconstruction in 1877.134 “Through unfriendly statutory 
construction or outright invalidation, the Court reined in a great many 
federal civil rights laws that sought to protect blacks,” although the 
“Constitution’s new enforcement clauses explicitly authorized” those 
statutes in “sweeping language.”135 The Court’s interpretations of the 
Reconstruction Amendments themselves also effectively neutered the 
work of Congress to amend the Constitution to protect African Americans 
and their supporters.136 
While, in retrospect, the most infamous judicial decision in the 
postbellum denial of equal protection for blacks came in 1896 in Plessy,137 
the Court’s hostility to Reconstruction rights was on display over a long 
                                                   
For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 provided that black citizens should enjoy equal rights in 
various respects and provided criminal penalties against any person found guilty of depriving citizens 
of those stated rights due to race, color, or previous condition of servitude. See Civil Rights Act of 
1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (reenacted by Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 
144 (1870)). Likewise, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, provided 
for federal supervision of state elections and aimed to protect black citizens against illegal 
intimidation. See Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). Also, the Civil Rights Act of 1875 
provided for equal enjoyment of public accommodations, including theaters, hotels, and modes of 
transportation, protected the rights of black citizens to serve as jurors, and gave blacks the right to sue 
for personal damages for violations. See Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875). 
131. See Amar, The Supreme Court, supra note 46, at 70. 
132. Summary of Events, 1 AM. L. REV. 572, 574 (1867). 
133. FONER, supra note 48, at 335; see also GOLDSTONE, supra note 1, at 12 (describing the Court 
as a “central player” in the “descent” into “enforced segregation” and “a nation where human beings 
could be tortured and horribly murdered without trial”); HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 71, 83 
(asserting that the Court went beyond the appropriate imposition of “checks and balances” and 
ultimately “opened the floodgates to blatant segregation and discrimination”). 
134. Harris, supra note 51, at 192 (describing the “formal demise of Reconstruction” that came 
about in 1877 to end the impasse over the presidential election of 1876). 
135. Amar, The Supreme Court, supra note 46, at 70–71; see also Balkin, supra note 129, at 1861 
(“Time and again, the Supreme Court hobbled Congress’s enforcement powers through specious 
technicalities and artificial distinctions.”).  
136. See MEYER, supra note 95, at 85. See also Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Abolition 
Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 3, 74 (2019) (“The Court also ‘crippled’ the federal 
government’s power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments to protect blacks from white terror, 
speeding the collapse of Reconstruction in the South.”). 
137. See Greene, supra note 9, at 396 (explaining based on empirical evidence that Plessy alone 
among such cases falls “within the anticanon”). 
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period that began much earlier.138 In 1872, in Blyew v. United States,139 
the Court narrowly construed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 so as not to 
strike down a Kentucky statute that forbade the testimony of a black 
person against a white person in a criminal case.140 In the Slaughter House 
Cases141 of 1873 and in United States v. Reese142 and United States v. 
Cruikshank143 from 1876, the Court “drastically curtailed the privileges 
and immunities recognized as being under federal protection”144 and 
effectively limited, among others, the right of African Americans to vote, 
which supposedly “had been guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment.”145 
                                                   
138. The Court was not always out of line with national sentiment on civil rights in the decades 
after the Civil War. See Michael J. Klarman, Court, Congress, and Civil Rights, in CONGRESS AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 173, 175 (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., 2005). By the time of the 
formal end of Reconstruction in 1877, “northern opinion” had become “increasingly dubious about 
federal intervention” in the South, and “military enforcement was no longer politically practicable” 
to promote the legal reforms enacted during the Reconstruction decade. KLARMAN, supra note 43, at 
10. Moreover, by that point, “virtually the entire South had been retaken—’redeemed’—by the 
political forces that had championed the Confederacy.” RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE 
LAW 41 (1997). “By 1874, the United States House of Representatives had gone Democratic.” 
KLUGER, supra note 1, at 59. Although the end of Reconstruction did not immediately halt progress 
toward equality for blacks, “around 1890, race relations in the South”—with the “relaxed 
constraints”—began a “long downward spiral.” KLARMAN, supra note 43, at 10–11. “From roughly 
1890 to 1910, neither Congress nor the Court displayed any significant sympathy for civil rights.” 
Klarman, supra note 138, at 175. 
139. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1872). 
140. The Court held that a criminal case “affects” only the party indicted and the government. See id. 
at 591. Thus, the Court ruled, a victim and witnesses to an alleged crime who were excluded from testifying 
against the defendant under a Kentucky statute because they were black could not bring suit in federal 
court to challenge the state law under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, although the Act gave jurisdiction to 
federal courts over causes “affecting” persons denied their civil rights. See id. at 591–92. 
141. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). The parties in the case were not African American, which may 
partially explain why the Slaughterhouse opinion contained rhetoric seemingly very helpful to African 
Americans, describing, for example, how the Fourteenth Amendment protected them. See id. at 67–72. 
142. 92 U.S. 214 (1875). 
143. 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
144. See WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 71; see also ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S 
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 531 (1st ed. 1988) (describing Cruikshank as making federal 
“prosecution of crimes committed against blacks virtually impossible” and giving “a green light to 
acts of terror where local officials either could not or would not enforce the law”); Martha T. 
McCluskey, Facing the Ghost of Cruikshank in Constitutional Law, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 278, 281 
(2015) (asserting that Cruikshank “cleared the way for violent restoration of a white supremacist legal 
order”); James Gray Pope, Snubbed Landmark: Why United States v. Cruikshank (1876) Belongs at 
the Heart of the American Constitutional Canon, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 388 (2014) (noting 
that Cruikshank “first limited the Fourteenth Amendment to protect only against specifically 
identified state violations, and not directly against private actions”). 
145. See KLUGER, supra note 1, at 58; see also Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing Representation: 
Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the Rehnquist and 
Waite Courts, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2341, 2351 (2003) (“Reese and Cruikshank indisputably hindered 
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The Court “continued the trend”146 with its decision in the Civil Rights 
Cases147 of 1883 by ruling that restrictions in the Civil Rights Act of 1875 
purporting to ban certain private misconduct against African Americans 
exceeded Congress’s authority under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.148 In another 1883 decision, United States v. Harris,149 the 
Court rejected federal criminal prosecutions of private persons for 
lynching an African-American man, brought under provisions of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871, again on grounds that the Fourteenth Amendment 
only authorized Congress to pass remedial legislation against state action, 
not action by private persons.150 That same year, in Pace v. Alabama,151 
the Court also rejected an equal protection challenge to an Alabama 
statute that effectively branded blacks as inferior by punishing adultery 
“more severely when committed between a white person and a black 
person than when committed between two people of the same race.”152 
When the Court during this era endorsed a Reconstruction right held 
by African Americans, the protection was also narrowly limited or largely 
unenforced. For example, in Strauder v. West Virginia,153 the Court, over 
two dissents, ruled for an African-American criminal defendant by 
striking down as a violation of equal protection a state statute that 
explicitly excluded African Americans from juries.154 Also, in Neal v. 
Delaware,155 the Court ruled for an African-American, criminal defendant 
                                                   
ongoing federal efforts to enforce the newly ratified Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.”).  
146. See WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 53. 
147. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
148. Id. at 24–32 (ruling that refusal of the private owner of an inn, a public conveyance, or a place 
of public amusement to accommodate blacks did not impose “any badge of slavery or servitude” and, 
thus, could not be prohibited by Congress based on its enforcement authority under those 
amendments). 
149. 106 U.S. 629 (1883). 
150. See id. at 638–41. 
151. 106 U.S. 583 (1883). 
152. Greene, supra note 9, at 412. 
153. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
154. See id. at 306. On the same day that it decided Strauder, the Court decided two related cases, 
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879), and Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879). In Ex parte 
Virginia, the Court upheld a federal statute that provided that no qualified person should be 
disqualified based on race from jury service in any state or federal court and under which a state judge 
was indicted for allegedly excluding black men from jury service based on race. See 100 U.S. at 348–
49. However, in Rives, the Court rejected an appeal from a black criminal defendant who claimed a 
right to have at least one-third of his jury comprised of blacks. See id. at 322. The Court also indicated 
in Rives, that, absent explicit discrimination in jury selection, such as that mandated by a state statute, 
a criminal defendant had to litigate his juror-exclusion claim in state court before seeking relief in 
federal court. See id. at 321–22.  
155. 103 U.S. 370 (1881). 
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who showed that no African American had ever been summoned for jury 
service in the state, although the African-American population exceeded 
twenty thousand by 1870 and comprised more than 17% of the state 
population by 1880.156 
Nonetheless, the Court limited the right “to cases involving black 
parties,”157 and the Strauder opinion, “intentionally or not, almost invited 
states” in selecting jurors “to rely on other criteria that might well have a 
disparate impact on African Americans.”158 The Court declared that a 
State could limit the selection of jurors “to males, to freeholders, to 
citizens, to persons within certain ages, or to persons having educational 
qualifications.”159 States used that advice “to circumvent the spirit of the 
ruling through property, level of education, and other juror qualification 
‘standards’ whose only real goal was racial discrimination.”160 When a 
few African Americans made it to jury pools for trials, parties could also 
use peremptory strikes to exclude them.161 With the Court avoiding any 
                                                   
156. See id. at 397–98. 
157. Amar, The Supreme Court, supra note 46, at 71 n.148. 
158. Sanford Levinson, Why Strauder v. West Virginia is the Most Important Single Source of Insight 
on the Tensions Contained Within the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 62 ST. 
LOUIS U. L. REV. 603, 621 (2018). 
Strauder and the companion cases offered “a gain, certainly, in rhetoric” for black persons. KLUGER, 
supra note 1, at 63–64. Language in the Strauder opinion, for example, acknowledged that African 
Americans suffered greatly from racial discrimination and that the Reconstruction Amendments aimed to 
protect them. See, e.g., Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306 (asserting that the amendments aimed to secure “to a 
race . . . that through many generations had been held in slavery, all the civil rights that the superior race 
enjoy.”). The opinion also acknowledged the harm to blacks from the West Virginia law. See id. at 308 
(“[P]ractically a brand upon them, affixed by law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that 
race prejudice which is an impediment to securing . . . equal justice.”).  
The Strauder ruling itself also effectively discounted various congressional statements during 
promulgation of the Fourteenth Amendment asserting that the provision would protect only “civil” and 
not “political” rights. See Levinson, supra note 158, at 610 (noting that jury service was a “paradigm 
case[]” of a “political right[]” and that, during the debates in Congress, “several legislators took great care 
to emphasize” that the Fourteenth Amendment covered only “civil,” not “political,” rights). Cf. Vikram 
David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 241 (1995) 
(contending that Strauder could have more easily rested on the Fifteenth Amendment).  
For a view of the Fourteenth Amendment from that era that proclaimed it as applicable “to all persons 
within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality,” see 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (applying the Equal Protection Clause in favor of laundry 
owners who suffered discrimination by public officials because of their Chinese ancestry). 
159. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310. 
160. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 73–74. 
161. See DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 116 (1999) (noting that “the Court expressly condoned 
race-based peremptory strikes as late as 1965”). 
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further steps to enable African-American jury service for the next fifty 
years, the practical effect of Strauder and Neal was minimal.162 
The Court conspicuously abandoned the pretense of respect for the 
equal value of African Americans in Plessy, a second case forming the 
core of constitutional law’s anti-canon.163 Homer Plessy, a man with “one-
eighth African blood” who appeared to be white,164 had tried to board a 
whites-only train car in Louisiana in 1892.165 In the South, “the period 
around 1890 marked a significant increase in the turn to legislatively 
mandated segregation,”166 commonly called “Jim Crow” laws.167 
Louisiana had passed a criminal statute that year that required separate 
railway cars for whites and non-whites on intra-state passenger trains168 
and that penalized with fines and imprisonment passengers who insisted 
on going into cars to which they were not assigned.169 In response to his 
prosecution, Plessy contended that the statute violated the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.170 However, by a seven-to-one margin,171 the 
                                                   
162. The Court in Strauder “announced a broad principle of nondiscrimination,” but “left its 
enforcement to state courts’.” Id. at 108; see also Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction, and 
Race Discrimination: The Lost Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1485–
86 (1983) (speculating that the Court feared that pressing too hard would promote more private 
vigilantism against blacks). In any event, “black jurors were nowhere to be found in many 
jurisdictions, while the Court sitting atop the judicial pyramid did almost nothing until 1935. Amar, 
The Supreme Court, supra note 46, at 71–72 n.148. By propping up the façade of a race-neutral 
criminal justice process that “imposed official violence on blacks,” the Court seemed mostly to 
“contribute[] to the ‘normalization’ and institutionalization of subordination, rendering it even more 
insidious and difficult to confront.” COLE, supra note 161, at 109.  
163. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 549–52 (1896). 
164. Id. at 541. 
165. See Harris, supra note 51, at 204–05. 
166. Cheryl I. Harris, In the Shadow of Plessy, 7 J. CONST. L. 867, 886 (2005) 
167. WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 7. 
168. The Supreme Court previously had ruled, under the Commerce Clause, in Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution, that states could not impose regulations on common carriers that imposed a direct burden on 
interstate commerce. See Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878) (striking down a Louisiana Reconstruction law 
that mandated racial integration of passengers on common carrier traveling interstate). 
169. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 540–41. 
170. See id. at 541–42. 
171. Justice David Brewer did not hear arguments or participate in the decision. See id. at 552. 
Because of the death of his daughter, he left Washington, D.C., to go to his home in Kansas on the 
day of the argument. See J. Gordon Hylton, The Justice Who Abstained in Plessy v. Ferguson: Justice 
David Brewer and the Problem of Race, 61 MISS. L.J. 315 (1991). 
The lone dissenter, Justice John Marshall Harlan, see Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552, was the son of a 
Kentucky slave-owner, and, according to a compelling, historical article, may have had a black half-
brother for whom he held affection, causing him vicariously to experience, as he put it, see id. at 562, 
the segregation law’s “brand of servitude and degradation.” See James W. Gordon, Did the First 
Justice Harlan Have a Black Brother?, 15 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 159, 234–36 (1993). 
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Supreme Court upheld the law’s enforced separation of the races.172 The 
decision marked the beginning of a half-century in which the Court 
allowed states explicitly to command extensive segregation of 
African  Americans.173 
Critics would be right to point out that Plessy was not the end of the 
Court’s decisions authorizing states’ subjugation of African Americans. 
Two years later, in Williams v. Mississippi,174 the Court upheld a 
Mississippi scheme to effectively disenfranchise African Americans by 
imposing, among other obstacles to voting, payment of a poll tax and 
passage of a literacy test under which local officials would decide who 
was literate.175 The following year, in Cumming v. Richmond County 
Board of Education,176 a unanimous Court, through Justice Harlan, upheld 
a local school board’s decision—purportedly based on resource scarcity—
to fund high school services for whites but not for African Americans.177 
In the 1903 case of  Giles v. Harris,178 Justice Holmes declared “political 
rights” unenforceable through equitable relief under the Reconstruction 
Amendments179 and declined to overturn provisions in Alabama’s 
constitution and statutes that effectively disenfranchised African 
Americans.180 Five years later, in Berea College v. Kentucky,181 the Court 
surrendered further to state efforts to force whites to shun African 
Americans by upholding a Kentucky law that prohibited the teaching of 
white and African-American students at the same time and place, even by 
a private college incorporated in the state.182 
                                                   
172. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 539. 
173. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 87 (noting that for fifty years after 1900, “Jim Crow 
laws proliferated in America”); id. at 115 (noting that Plessy “resulted in decades of blatant 
segregation of blacks in public settings”). 
174. 170 U.S. 213 (1898). 
175. See id. at 220–25. 
176. 175 U.S. 528 (1899). 
177. See id. at 545 (asserting that “the education of people in schools maintained by state taxation 
is a matter belonging to the respective [s]tates” and federal authority should rarely interfere). 
178. 189 U.S. 475 (1903). 
179. See Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 
295, 298 (2000) (“notwithstanding the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, Giles carves out from 
them the category of ‘political rights’ and holds such rights unenforceable”).  
180. See Giles, 189 U.S. at 488. Justice Holmes did allow that violation of such rights could be the 
subject of a suit for money damages. See id. at 485. Two decades later, in Nixon v Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 
(1927), Justice Holmes also wrote the opinion for the Court allowing a suit for money damages against the 
Texas Judges of Elections for denying a qualified African American man the opportunity to vote in a state 
primary election based on a state statute barring blacks from participation. See id. at 540–41. 
181. 211 U.S. 45 (1908). 
182. See id. at 56–58. 
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While Plessy was not the last of the Court’s decisions that greatly 
injured African Americans, the Court’s conduct in that case earned its 
special infamy.183 In addition to endorsing extensive, de jure segregation, 
the Plessy opinion used white supremacist language to deride African 
Americans as social beings.184 The degradation came with the effort to 
explain why segregation on the railways would not deny African 
Americans of property, in the form of social status, under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.185 The Court said that African Americans were 
“inferior . . . socially,”186 and, thus, the African American forced to sit 
with African Americans suffered no injury: “if he be a colored man, and 
be so assigned, he has been deprived of no property, since he is not 
lawfully entitled to the reputation of being a white man.”187 Underscoring 
its disrespect for African Americans, the Court noted that there could be 
a denial of property to a white man if he were forced to sit in the non-
whites car: “[i]f he be a white man, and assigned to a colored coach, he 
may have his action for damages against the company.”188 The differing 
outcomes, again, found explanation in the endorsement of white 
supremacy. African Americans purportedly were destined to remain lesser 
social beings as part of the natural order: “[i]f one race be inferior to the 
other socially, the constitution of the United States cannot put them upon 
the same plane.”189 
The Plessy opinion compounded the insult that African Americans 
were natively “inferior” by simultaneously denying “that the enforced 
separation of the two races stamp[ed] the colored race with a badge of 
inferiority.”190 According to the Court, “[i]f this be so, it is not by reason 
of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses 
to put that construction upon it.”191 But, if segregation was not a stamp of 
inferiority, why had the Court itself asserted that “colored” people were 
“inferior?” And why would a white man forced to sit in a railway car with 
African Americans have a cause of action, according to the Court, for 
denigration of his status? The discordant assertions suggested not simply 
                                                   
183. See, e.g., GATES, supra note 16, at 34 (calling Plessy “the most notorious example of the 
Supreme Court restricting civil rights”). 
184. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 549–52 (1896). 
185. See id. at 548–49. 
186. Id. at 552.  
187. Id. at 549; see also WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 93 (explaining why the Jim Crow laws 
implied that all African Americans were inferior to all whites). 
188. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 549. 
189. Id. at 552; see also id. at 551 (asserting the absence of “natural affinities” between the races). 
190. Id. at 551. 
191. Id. 
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“self-induced blindness”192 but judicial dishonesty about the social 
meaning of the Louisiana law.193 “Segregation in the South [came] down 
in apostolic succession from slavery and the Dred Scott case,” and was 
“set up and continued for the very purpose of keeping” African Americans 
“in an inferior station.”194 It was “an instrument of subordination . . . to 
any honest observer.”195 The Court appeared to be bald-faced lying. And, 
if the Court was lying on that score, wasn’t the message that it would also 
prevaricate when states provided lesser benefits or protections to the 
segregated African Americans? 
The harm of Plessy for African Americans was incalculable,196 as the 
decision enabled states to publicly denigrate them through pervasive 
demands of separation197 and to give them lesser accommodations and 
services.198 Indeed, for decades, “government programs and societal 
practices openly excluded African Americans from economic and 
educational opportunities.”199 The message of inferiority fueled by Plessy 
also negatively affected the perception of many African Americans 
                                                   
192. See Black, supra note 3, at 426; id. at 422 n.8 (asserting in regard to the Court’s claim that 
any “badge of inferiority” was only in the minds of black people: “[t]he curves of callousness and 
stupidity intersect at their respective maxima”). 
193. Why, also, was it permitted, as Justice Harlan noted in dissent, see Plessy, 163 U.S. at 553 
(Harlan, J., dissenting), for a white person to have an African-American nanny in the whites-only car, 
unless it was because the “social meaning” of her presence as a “subordinate” was clear? See Amar, 
Plessy v. Ferguson, supra note 9, at 85. 
194. See Black, supra note 3, at 424. 
195. Amar, The Supreme Court, supra note 46, at 65. 
196. See, e.g., FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 47, at 471 (“The effect of this whole experience upon 
African Americans cannot be fully measured or even appreciated.”). See also HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 
1, at 85–116 (detailing the many ways in which legally legitimized segregation harmed African Americans). 
197. “By linking racial separation on trains with that in education,” the Plessy decision also placed 
“the Court’s imprimatur on a considerably expanded field in which segregation was justified.” Pratt, 
supra note 2, at 739. And after Plessy, pervasive, judicially-endorsed segregation in the South 
“became in very short time a reality.” WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 84.   
198. The Court later began to reject states’ schemes to provide lesser benefits to blacks. In Missouri 
ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), the victim, Lloyd Gaines, challenged his denial by the 
University of Missouri to its whites-only law school and its failure to provide a law school for African 
Americans. The Court affirmed Plessy to the extent of not requiring Missouri to admit Gaines to its 
law school but also ruled that the state must fund a law school for African Americans that was similar 
to the one provided for whites rather than merely paying for African Americans to attend an out-of-
state law school to which they might gain admission. See id. at 351. However, Gaines never realized 
the benefit. “On March 19, 1939, several months after the decision, but prior to his enrollment in law 
school, Gaines suddenly disappeared—one afternoon, Gaines left the fraternity house where he 
resided to buy some stamps, and he was never seen again.” HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 112 
(footnotes omitted). “Many believe that Gaines paid the ultimate sacrifice, giving his life to bridge 
the racial divide.” Id. 
199. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 115. 
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regarding their own self-worth, and that kind of psychic damage could 
begin early in childhood.200 Perhaps most appalling, the judicially 
approved segregation supported by the Court’s official reiteration that 
African Americans were inferior encouraged their violent treatment at the 
hands of white persons.201 Plessy was, in effect, permission from the Court 
for white people to be virulent racists, which helped “fear, jealously, 
proscription, hatred, and fanaticism”202 by whites toward African 
Americans to reach largely unrestrained expression.203 
Decades later, Gunnar Myrdal, a Swedish sociologist—and, later, 
Nobel Prize winning economist—famously chronicled204 the horror of 
private violence and governmental indifference (and more) that had 
befallen many African Americans in Plessy’s Jim Crow South.205 Racial 
violence against African Americans, acquiesced in or promoted by 
government, was also widespread in northern states, particularly to 
prevent residential integration.206 Yet the pervasive and brutal nature of 
racial violence was especially noteworthy in the former slave states. 
                                                   
200. See, e.g., KLUGER, supra note 1, at 421 (quoting testimony in the Brown case of Professor 
Louisa Pinkham Holt on the often-negative effects of legally enforced racial segregation on the sense 
of self-worth and potential for achievement of the victims). See also Catherine MacKinnon, 
MacKinnon, J., Concurring in the Judgment, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD 
HAVE SAID 143, 146–47 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) (contending that the “authoritative relegation of 
equals to a social status of inferiority . . . is always harmful,” and “the injury . . . lies not in the 
children’s response to the state practice but in the practice itself”). 
201. See WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 93–94 (asserting that the Jim Crow laws “gave free rein and the 
majesty of law to mass aggressions that might otherwise have been curbed, blunted or deflected” and made 
Southern whites increasingly more combative and violent in their dealings with African Americans). 
202. Id. at 51. 
203. See, e.g., KLUGER, supra note 1, at 84 (“The toxins of racism flourished as never before 
throughout America during the first fifteen years of the twentieth century.”). 
Did the Supreme Court begin to turn the page with its anti-peonage decisions that rejected statutes 
rendering persons who breached employment contracts indentured servants? See United States v. 
Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911). For the view that those 
decisions represented one of the Court’s “greatest achievements” as “a contribution to justice for 
black people,” see Alexander Bickel & Benno C. Schmidt Jr., The Judiciary and Responsible 
Government: 1910–1921, 820, in 9 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1984). For the view that those decisions were ineffective in stopping 
peonage and of minimal importance for African Americans, see Randall Kennedy, Race Relations 
Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case of Professor Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 
1646–48 (1986). 
204. Although on a different point, in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the 
Supreme Court cited Myrdal’s work. See id. at 494 n.11. 
205. See generally 2 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND 
MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944). 
206. See RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW 143 (2017) (“During much of the twentieth 
century, police tolerance and promotion of cross-burnings, vandalism, arson, and other violent acts to 
maintain residential segregation was systematic and nationwide.”). 
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Myrdal reported, “Any white man can strike or beat a Negro, steal or 
destroy his property, cheat him in a transaction and even take his life, 
without much fear of legal reprisal.”207 Myrdal reported that the “minor 
forms of violence—cheating and striking”—were “a matter of everyday 
occurrence.”208 African Americans in the South often depended 
economically upon whites and had to interact with them.209 Thus, they 
were forced through self-abasement before whites to try “to avoid 
situations in which such violence [was] likely to occur.”210 When African 
Americans invoked the displeasure of a white man, they also generally 
bore the humiliation of responding obsequiously to his “command[s] 
[and] threat[s],” hoping to avoid physical harm.211 At the same time, 
“accidental insult, and sometimes nothing at all except the general 
insecurity or sadism of certain whites, [could] serve as occasion 
for  violence.”212 
While the white man in the South was generally secure in the Jim Crow 
era against allegations from an African American, Southern courts 
discriminated harshly against African Americans alleged to have 
mistreated or responded with violence toward a white person.213 The lives 
of African Americans often did not matter much to white prosecutors, 
judges, and juries.214 That is not to say that African-American defendants 
were always treated unfairly. If the victim was another African American, 
the criminal justice system might give the African-American defendant 
only a modest reprove. Accordingly, “[a]s long as only Negroes [were] 
concerned and no whites [were] disturbed, great leniency [would] be 
shown in most cases.”215 Although “white Southerners” thought this was 
“evidence of the friendliness of Southern courts toward Negroes,” the 
“Southern Negro community [was] not at all happy about [the] double 
standard,” because it was “actually a form of discrimination” that left 
African-American communities vulnerable to crime.216 Indeed, both race-
of-complainant and race-of-defendant discrimination operated and at 
                                                   
207. See MYRDAL, supra note 205, at 559. 
208. Id. 
209. See id. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. 
213. See id. at 553. 
214. See id. at 551–53 (noting the disregard shown for the just treatment of African Americans 
accused of crimes against whites). 
215. Id. at 551.  
216. Id. 
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times synergistically. When an African American was alleged to have 
committed a crime against a white person, particularly a serious offense, 
there was little possibility for fair adjudication or leniency.217 And, “[i]n 
the case of a threatened lynching, the court[s made] no pretense at justice; 
the Negro [had to] be condemned, and usually condemned to death, before 
the crowd [got] him.”218 
During Jim Crow, not only the threat of lynching but lynching itself 
was a regular and widely-used form of violence against African-American 
communities and their supporters.219 A lynching did not require that the 
African-American victim commit a crime; a slight insult or even an 
erroneous accusation of disrespect toward a white person could be 
enough.220 The number of lynchings had already begun accelerating from 
the time of the Civil Rights Cases221 through the early 1890s.222 “By 1892, 
lynchings had climbed to an unofficial [annual] figure of 231, the most 
ever in a single year.”223 While that was the annual peak in documented 
cases, Southern lynchings in the decades after Plessy became even more 
“a tool of racial control that terrorized and targeted African 
Americans.”224 “The ratio of black lynching victims to white lynching 
victims was 4 to 1 from 1882 to 1889; increased to more than 6 to 1 
between 1890 to 1900; and soared to more than 17 to 1 after 1900.”225 As 
                                                   
217. See id. at 551–53. 
218. Id. at 553. 
219. In America, lynching emerged in the Western frontier in the early 1800s as vigilante justice 
that did not necessarily mean killing, although by the 1830s, “lynching became synonymous with 
hanging.” EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE’S REPORT ON LYNCHING, supra note 20, at 27. Although 
lynching was used into the late 1800s as a form of vigilante “punishment” not only for blacks but also 
“for whites, Mexican, Chinese, and Native Americans,” it later took on “a distinctly black/white 
character.” Ogletree, supra note 20, at 58. By the 1900s, “lynching had come almost exclusively to 
mean the summary execution of Southern black men.” PHILLIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS 
UNKNOWN: THE LYNCHING OF BLACK AMERICA 18 (2003). 
The greatest crusader against lynching in the Jim Crow era was an African American woman, Ida 
B. Wells. See CONE, supra note 16, at 126–33 (recounting Wells’s campaign). For a compilation of 
Wells’s most important writings on the subject, see IDA B. WELLS-BARNETT, ON LYNCHINGS (Dover 
ed. 2014) (1892). 
220. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE’S REPORT ON LYNCHING, supra note 20, at 29 (“African Americans 
frequently were lynched for non-criminal violations of social customs or racial expectations, such as 
speaking to white people with less respect or formality than observers believed was due.”). 
221. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
222. See KLUGER, supra note 1, at 68. 
223. Id. 
224. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE’S REPORT ON LYNCHING, supra note 20, at 27; see also STEWART 
E. TOLNAY & E. M. BECK, A FESTIVAL OF VIOLENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOUTHERN LYNCHINGS, 
1882–1930, at 17 (1992) (asserting that lynching increasingly became a “routine and systematic effort 
to subjugate the African American minority”). 
225. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE’S REPORT ON LYNCHING, supra note 20, at 27. 
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Jim Crow hardened in place, “[t]he character of the violence also 
changed,” with “gruesome public spectacle lynchings” involving 
“prolonged torture, mutilation, dismemberment, and burning at the stake,” 
becoming “much more common.”226 Between the end of Reconstruction 
and 1950, white mobs carried out approximately 4,400 documented, 
racial-hatred lynchings,227 almost all in the former slave states in which 
Plessy-approved segregation held sway.228 
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S FAILURE TO ATONE 
Has the Supreme Court adequately pursued redemption for its 
complicity in the reign of racial hatred that engulfed much of the United 
States for decades and impeded the journey of African Americans from 
slavery toward equality? The Court has failed decisively to pursue 
expiation according to the standards that this Article proposes.229 The 
Court has played a valuable role in the movement to end de jure 
segregation, and it has otherwise taken numerous steps in the modern era 
to help shield racial minorities somewhat from unjust discriminations.230 
However, as a body, the Court has eschewed rationales for its rulings 
protecting racial minorities that fully expose the institution’s past 
                                                   
226. Id. at 28, 50; see also MANFRED BERG, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF LYNCHING IN 
AMERICA 94 (2011) (noting that these sadistic tortures of the victim were often festive events for the 
white crowd in observance).  
227. In United States v. Shipp, 214 U.S. 386 (1909), the Supreme Court expressed its irritation 
over a lynching that rendered moot the Court’s allowance of an appeal to review the criminal 
conviction and death sentence of an African-American defendant, one Ed Johnson. After the Court 
allowed the appeal, Shipp, the local sheriff in Chattanooga, Tennessee, who held Johnson in custody 
and who was aware of the Court’s action, aided and abetted a mob who took Johnson from the jail 
and lynched him. See id. at 423. The Court ordered Shipp, among others, to be tried for contempt. In 
the first trial in the Supreme Court’s history, Shipp was found guilty, and the Court subsequently 
upheld the conviction. See id. at 425. However, for his crime, the justices ordered Shipp to serve only 
ninety days in the District of Columbia jail. See Mark Curriden, A Supreme Case of Contempt, 
ABAJ. (June 2, 2009, 4:50 AM) https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a_supreme_case_of_
contempt [https://perma.cc/VVQ2-4Y4J]. 
Shipp was also released early, and returning to Chattanooga by train, “was greeted with a hero’s 
welcome by more than 10,000 cheering supporters. Later, a monument was erected in his honor.” Id. 
228. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE’S REPORT ON LYNCHING, supra note 20, at 4 (documenting 
4,084 such lynchings in twelve Southern states and more than 300 in other states). 
229. See supra text accompanying note 15; see also DYSON, supra note 15, at 78–80, 197 (arguing 
for recognition that separate-but-equal policy produced enduring inequality for which there should be 
acceptance of responsibility and reparation). 
230. See infra notes 234–287 and accompanying text. See also Jack M. Balkin, Brown v. Board of 
Education; A Critical Introduction, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 
1, 24–25 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) (contending that the Brown decision had an important, positive 
influence in promoting civil rights and racial equality). 
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collaborations with the forces seeking to ensure perpetual, white 
supremacy.231 And the Court, as a body, has never provided an 
institutional apology for its conduct in Dred Scott and Plessy.232 In his 
dissent in Plessy, Justice Harlan hinted that a duty to “atone” would 
eventually be the price of the Court’s actions that day, which he accurately 
predicted would rival in infamy the Court’s conduct in Dred Scott.233 If 
the Court aims for true atonement and the maximum it can inspire in racial 
reconciliation, there is reason to doubt that it has adequately reckoned 
with that call to conscience. 
A. Brown and its Aftermath in the 1950s 
The Court did not atone in Brown v. Board of Education.234 Despite the 
iconic and beloved status of that decision among those who believe in the 
“Great Progressive Narrative” of our Constitution,235 the holding and 
rationale of the Brown opinion were narrowly limited.236 The Court 
declared de jure segregation unconstitutional for public primary and 
                                                   
231. See infra notes 234–287 and accompanying text. 
232. Individual justices or groups of justices constituting less than a Court majority have at times 
hinted at their embarrassment over Dred Scott or Plessy. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 
515 U.S. 200, 272 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that, in Plessy, “this Court endorse[d] the 
oppressive practice of race segregation” and that “[n]ot until Loving v. Virgina, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967) . . . could one say with security that the Constitution and this Court would abide no measure 
‘designed to maintain White Supremacy’”); Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma City Public Sch. v. Dowell, 
498 U.S. 237, 257 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referring to the “ugly legacy” of Plessy); Metro 
Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 631 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The fundamental 
errors in Plessy, its standard of review and its validation of rank racial insult by the State, distorted 
the law for six decades . . . .”); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 344 (1987) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“we have sought to free ourselves from the burden of this history”). 
233. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The thin disguise of ‘equal’ 
accommodations for passengers in railroad coaches will not mislead any one, nor atone for the wrong 
this day done.”); id. at 559 (“In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be 
quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott Case.”). 
234. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
235. See Balkin, supra note 229, at 3–5 (asserting that “Brown has become a beloved legal and 
political icon,” in part because the ruling comports with the “Great Progressive Narrative”). But see 
Gerald N. Rosenberg, African-American Rights After Brown, in BLACK, WHITE AND BROWN 203, 
208–33 (2004) (expressing doubts that Brown had significant impact on school desegregation or the 
civil rights movement). See also KLARMAN, JIM CROW, supra note 43, at 7 (arguing for “a middle 
ground” between the views at one extreme that Brown “created the civil rights movement and at the 
other that it had no impact whatsoever”).  
236. For a more transparent and institutionally self-reflective version of what at least a concurring 
opinion in Brown might have said, see Drew S. Days III, Days, J., Concurring, in WHAT BROWN V. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 92–99 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).  
For a forceful and insightful version of what a dissenting opinion in Brown might have said, see 
Derrick Bell, Bell, J., Dissenting, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 
185–200 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001). 
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secondary schools as a carve-out from Plessy’s “separate but equal” 
doctrine.237 This declaration did not include a renunciation of the Court’s 
position in Dred Scott and Plessy that African Americans were naturally 
“inferior.”238 The Brown Court asserted simply that public education had 
become much more important to personal and civic development since 
Plessy and that “modern” psychological authority, unavailable when 
Plessy was decided, showed that legally-segregated schools tended to 
retard the development of black children by generating in them a feeling 
of inferiority.239 There was no explicit rejection even of the Plessy Court’s 
fabrication about the neutrality of Jim Crow laws generally.240 One could 
read Brown without surmising that the Court experienced institutional 
shame for anything said or done in Plessy.241 
In the immediate aftermath of Brown, the Court also offered no 
institutional apology for its past conduct. Bolling v. Sharpe,242 a 
companion case to Brown, saw the Court extend Brown’s equal protection 
ruling to the District of Columbia schools through the Fifth Amendment 
Due Process Clause without mention of Plessy or much elaboration.243 In 
Brown II,244 which focused on remedy, the Court also did not mention 
Plessy and, as for the future, softened Brown, by allowing localities to 
proceed with school desegregation with “all deliberate speed,” meaning 
gradually.245 The Court extended Brown to public graduate and 
professional schools in a terse opinion in 1956 that called for immediate 
action but that also made no mention of Plessy.246 The Court’s extension 
of Brown to other kinds of public accommodations in the 1950s came 
                                                   
237. The Court posed the question presented as “whether Plessy v. Ferguson should be held 
inapplicable to public education.” Brown, 347 U.S. at 492. The Court articulated its ruling as follows: 
“[w]e conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. 
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.” Id. at 495. 
238. See supra notes 122–124 & 190 and accompanying text (quoting Dred Scott and Plessy). 
239. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 492–95. 
240. An implicit and oblique rejection of the Plessy Court’s fabrication, see supra notes 191–193 
and accompanying text, arguably appeared in the Brown Court’s citation to authorities indicating that 
legally-enforced segregation outside of the public-school context also could negatively affect the self-
perceptions of African Americans. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.11. 
241. See STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 11, at 91 (describing the Brown opinion as having 
“whitewashed the long-standing connections between chattel slavery, white supremacist ideology, 
and state segregation of schools”). 
242. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
243. See id. at 499–500. 
244. See Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).  
245. Id. at 301. See also CHARLES J. OGLETREE, ALL DELIBERATE SPEED 125 (2004) (“Brown 
II . . . signaled that southern school boards could move gradually . . . .”). 
246. See Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Bd. of Control, 350 U.S. 413, 414 (1956) (per curiam). 
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through several orders merely affirming lower court decisions, in none of 
which the Court offered any institutional repentance for its own past 
complicity in the nightmare of de jure segregation.247 
B. The 1960s Through the Mid-1970s 
In decisions from the 1960s and 1970s, the Court also expressed no 
institutional contrition. Even when rejecting some of the post-
Reconstruction precedents that helped subjugate African Americans,248 
the Warren Court offered no apologies for the past. For example, in 
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,249 the Court, over three dissents,250 
rejected a state law that imposed as a prerequisite to voting in state 
elections a poll tax of $1.50 that Harper, an African-American woman, 
could not pay.251 The ruling partially undermined the Williams decision 
that came two years after Plessy.252 Justice Douglas, for the majority, at 
least mentioned Plessy and noted that its declarations of what constituted 
equal or unequal treatment “sound strange to a contemporary ear.”253 
However, he offered no further indication of institutional shame.254 The 
                                                   
247. See, e.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n. v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958) 
(public parks), aff’d per curiam, 358 U.S. 54 (1958); 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956) (public 
transportation), aff’d per curiam, Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); Holmes v. Atlanta, 223 
F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955) (public golf courses), rev’d, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Mayor & City Council of 
Baltimore v. Dawson, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955) (public beaches), aff’d 350 U.S. 877 (1955). 
248. The Court has not overruled all of those old rulings. For example, the modern Court has 
reaffirmed its ruling in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), that section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not give Congress power to regulate private parties. See United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598, 620–23 (2000). That ruling remains harmful because it means that, “[i]f states fail to 
enforce their laws to protect certain groups, federal legislation offering alternative remedies” to try to 
enforce the Equal Protection Clause will be hampered to the extent that the private conduct cannot be 
regulated under the Commerce Clause. Kermit Roosevelt, III, Bait and Switch: Why United States v. 
Morrison is Wrong About Section 5, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 623 (2015). 
249. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
250. See id. at 670 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 680 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
251. See id. at 664 n.1. Harper’s claim was based on the Equal Protection Clause. The Twenty-
Fourth Amendment, ratified in 1964, had made poll taxes unconstitutional in federal elections, but 
not state elections. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV. 
252. For discussion of Williams, see supra text at notes 174–175. 
The Harper Court actually rejected a more recent precedent. In Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 
(1937), the Court had reaffirmed that states could impose poll taxes as a condition of voting. See id. 
at 283–84. The Harper Court said that it overruled Breedlove on that score, without reference to the 
1898 Williams decision. See Harper, 383 U.S. at 669.   
253. Harper, 383 U.S. at 669. 
254. Justice Douglas several times conveyed a more insightful and irreverent view of judicial and 
legislative history in civil rights cases when he was not writing for the Court majority. See, e.g., Jones 
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 444–49 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring); Bell v. Maryland, 
378 U.S. 226, 242–85 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 
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stated reason for abandoning precedent was antiseptic: “[n]otions of what 
constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do 
change.”255In other 1960s cases overruling Plessy-era precedents, the 
Court did no better in atoning. For example, in Loving v. Virginia,256 the 
Court struck down long-standing Virginia statutes that criminalized, as to 
both parties, any marriage between a “white person” and a “colored 
person.”257 Through Chief Justice Warren, the Court at least conveyed that 
the racial classification embodied in the miscegenation laws involved 
“invidious” discrimination that were designed to maintain “White 
Supremacy.”258 Warren also openly rejected Virginia’s claim that the 
Pace decision, from 1883,259 supported the state’s “equal application” 
theory that the law was proper because it punished both parties equally.260 
Of course, that was similar to a theory that the Court had later used in 
Plessy to support de jure segregation.261 However, Warren simply noted 
that the reasoning in Pace had not “withstood analysis in the subsequent 
decisions of this Court.”262 And as for Plessy, there was no mention of it, 
let alone any expression of institutional remorse.263 
There is also nothing close to an apology from the Court in its primary 
and secondary school desegregation decisions from the 1960s and 
1970s.264 In several of those cases, the Court affirmed remedies for past 
constitutional violations in the form of legally-enforced segregation.265 
Those cases presented precisely the kinds of segregation that the Plessy 
                                                   
379 U.S. 241, 279–91 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
255. Harper, 383 U.S. at 669 (emphasis added). 
256. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
257. See id. at 4–6 (describing the statutes and noting that they dated to Virginia’s “Racial Integrity 
Act” of 1924). 
258. Id.; id. at 11–12. 
259. For more on Pace, see supra notes 151–152. 
260. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 10. 
261. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (asserting that there was not “anything found in 
the act” mandating separation of the races that “stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority”). 
262. Loving, 388 U.S. at 10 (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 188 (1964)). 
263. For a history of Fifteenth Amendment litigation that begins with states’ efforts to 
disenfranchise African Americans voters in the 1800s but omits the Court’s complicit decisions and 
selectively mentions rulings that aimed to be more helpful to African American citizens, see Chief 
Justice Warren’s majority opinion in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310–11 (1966). 
264. In some such cases, the Court rejected desegregation remedies imposed by lower courts, 
because the remedies were deemed to exceed the extent of the violations. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. 
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 413–18 (1977); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 737–53 (1974). 
265. See Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of 
Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971). 
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opinion had approved in dicta,266 and, thus, those cases presented relevant 
vehicles for pursuing judicial expiation. However, the Court did not 
express contrition. 
C. The Late 1970s and Beyond 
The Court’s opinions from the late 1970s and beyond also lack in 
efforts at purgation for the Court’s past degradation of African Americans. 
The “affirmative action” cases do not meet the standard. The Court has 
agreed that Congress can, within limits, “identify and redress the effects 
of society-wide discrimination.”267 The Court also has declared that “a 
state or local subdivision (if delegated the authority from the State) has 
the authority to eradicate the effects of private discrimination within its 
own legislative jurisdiction,” subject to “strict scrutiny.”268 In the sphere 
of higher education, the Court also has held that states can use narrowly-
tailored racial preferences in admissions to pursue diversity-associated 
goals.269 However, one searching through those opinions for anything 
approaching a confession and apology by the Court for Dred Scott and 
Plessy will come up empty-handed. 
The Court at times seems to have consciously avoided acknowledging 
the violence, its own complicity, or any duty to atone. Consider Coker v. 
Georgia,270 a 1977 decision in which the Court held that the death penalty 
for the rape of an adult was cruel and unusual.271 From 1930, when 
national statistics began being compiled, to 1972, when the Court 
                                                   
266. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544 (asserting that segregated schools for children had long been the 
norm almost universally). 
267. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989) (reiterating Congress’s power 
to identify and redress discrimination under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, but ruling that 
states are restricted from doing so under section one of that Amendment); see also Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (plurality opinion) (upholding a 10% set-aside for minority business 
enterprises, contained in a federal public works employment act against a challenge based on the 
equal protection demands of the Due Process Clause). 
268. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 491–92, 493. 
269. See Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207–15 (2016) (upholding 
narrowly-tailored use, as determined non-deferentially by the judiciary, of racial preferences for 
minority applicants to secure the educational benefits of student diversity); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (upholding narrowly-tailored use of racial preferences in admissions by the 
University of Michigan Law School to obtain the educational benefits of a diverse student body); cf. 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (striking down racially-based set-
aside program of admissions by state medical school but holding that a state “has a substantial interest 
that legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive 
consideration of race and ethnic origin”). 
270. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
271. See id. at 598–600. 
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invalidated standard-less capital sentencing in Furman v. Georgia,272 
89%, or 405, of the 455 men executed for rape were African American, 
and “virtually all . . . were accused of raping white women.”273 Also, it 
seems that “no white man has ever been executed for raping a black 
victim.”274 Those statistics almost certainly help explain why the Court, 
in Coker, declared the death penalty disproportionate punishment for the 
rape of an adult victim.275 However, the Court avoided discussing the 
racial bias problem or any hint of the past judicially legitimized 
degradation of African Americans.276 In a context involving the 
discriminatory use of extraordinary state violence against African 
Americans, the Court eschewed a rationale that it could have used to atone 
for its complicity in the long and violent campaign for white supremacy.277 
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,278 concerning whether to overrule 
precedent in the abortion context, a five-justice majority asserted that “we 
think Plessy was wrong the day it was decided,”279 but did not go much 
further in its criticism. Indeed, the larger point of those justices was that 
the “facts” arguably had changed between Plessy and Brown, unlike in the 
abortion context.280 Those justices wanted to underscore that, if members 
of the Plessy Court, they would have found the legislatively mandated 
segregation to be a “badge of inferiority” and “inherently unequal.”281 
That concession was commendable. At the same time, they implied that 
reasonable people could have disagreed: “[s]ociety’s understanding of the 
facts [was] . . . fundamentally different from the basis claimed for the 
decision in 1896.”282 Such qualified disagreement with Plessy can hardly 
count as a confession and apology. 
Perhaps the Court’s best effort at institutional contrition for the insult 
and injury of Plessy (or Dred Scott) to African Americans and their 
                                                   
272. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
273. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Coker v. Georgia: Of Rape, Race, and Burying the Past, in DEATH 
PENALTY STORIES 171, 193 (John H. Blume & Jordan M. Steiker eds., 2009). 
274. Id. 
275. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 597, 600; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 11, at 97 (concluding that 
“Coker represents the height of the Court’s avoidance of race”).  
276. See Johnson, supra note 273, at 179–83. 
277. For an outline of the constitutional rationale that the Court could have employed, see infra 
Parts V and VI.  
278. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
279. Id. at 863 (O’Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, J., joined by Blackmun & Stevens, J.). 
280. See id. at 864. 
281. Id. at 862–63.   
282. Id. at 863. 
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supporters came in Bob Jones University v. United States.283 There, the 
Court held that nonprofit, private schools and universities that enforce 
racially discriminatory admissions standards based on religious grounds 
do not qualify as tax-exempt organizations under the Internal Revenue 
Code and that contributions to such institutions are not deductible as 
charitable contributions.284 The opinion contained several sentences 
denouncing racial discrimination and implicitly criticizing Plessy and, 
perhaps, Dred Scott. At one point, the Court asserted, “[g]iven the stress 
and anguish of the history of efforts to escape from the shackles of the 
‘separate but equal’ doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, . . . it cannot be said 
that educational institutions that, for whatever reasons, practice racial 
discrimination, are institutions exercising ‘beneficial and stabilizing 
influences in community life.’”285 At another point, the Court proclaimed 
that “Government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating 
racial discrimination in education—discrimination that prevailed, with 
official approval, for the first 165 years of the Nation’s constitutional 
history.”286 Those statements aim to heal. Yet they do not qualify as a 
confession and apology. No effort can come close if it does not 
acknowledge in some detail the degrading consequences of Jim Crow, 
including the physical and psychic violence that was inflicted on 
African  Americans.287 
III. OVERCOMING POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO ATONEMENT 
Given the Court’s failure thus far to explicitly atone institutionally for 
Dred Scott and Plessy, should it now do so? This Article argues that it 
should and proposes robust atonement that would include transparent 
confession of the wrongs done, acknowledgment of the associated 
damages inflicted, apology for the transgressions and injuries, and a 
relevant ruling to underscore sincerity. Following that course would signal 
that the Court believes enough in equal justice for African Americans and 
the nation’s ability to achieve it to reject lingering concern with treading 
lightly so as not to inflame opposing forces. The message could also invite 
a shared recognition—and a “shared anger and grief”288—regarding the 
brutally improper treatment of a large segment of our people. Given the 
Court’s participation in the subjugation of African Americans for 
                                                   
283. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
284. See id. at 604–05. 
285. Id. at 595 (internal citations omitted). 
286. Id. at 604 (footnote omitted). 
287. See supra notes 200–208 and accompanying text. 
288. Kim, supra note 18, at 500. 
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decades,289 that seems like a worthy effort. Nonetheless, to further 
examine the utility and feasibility of the endeavor, this Part considers 
some possible general objections.290 
A. The Argument that the Rulings in Dred Scott and Plessy Were Not 
Wrong When Rendered 
Could one argue that the Court was not wrong in its holdings in Dred 
Scott and Plessy when they were rendered and, thus, that there is little 
reason to apologize?291 The underlying explanation would center on the 
notion that the Constitution did not give clear answers in Dred Scott and 
Plessy. An approach to constitutional construction other than originalism 
would have to underlie such an objection. Virtually no serious scholars 
now publicly contend that the original Constitution or the Reconstruction 
Amendments required the rulings in Dred Scott and Plessy.292 Indeed, to 
try to save originalism as an interpretive approach, some of its leading 
proponents have attempted to explain why, instead, Brown v. Board of 
Education was required as a matter of original meaning.293 “It is often said 
that no theory of constitutional interpretation is sound if it cannot explain 
and justify” the Brown decision.294 But originalism contemplates a 
Constitution with many fixed meanings and that a ruling justified on 
original meaning does not become unjustified absent changed facts or a 
constitutional amendment.295 
                                                   
289. See supra Parts II & III. 
290. This Part does not aim to address all possible general objections but rather some central ones 
as to which answers can best help elucidate the rationales and value of confession and apology. 
291. Cf., e.g., GRABER, supra note 43, at 28 (“Taney’s constitutional claims in Dred Scott were 
well within the mainstream of antebellum constitutional thought.”); CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE 
PLESSY CASE 197–98 (1987) (asserting that the conclusions in the majority opinion in Plessy, from 
the standpoint of the 1890s, “did not rest on bad logic, bad social science, bad history or bad 
constitutional law” and “did not lack substantial support in contemporary expert opinion”). 
292. But cf. JERROLD M. PACKARD, AMERICAN NIGHTMARE 75–76 (2002) (“The [Plessy] decision, 
in fact seemed to have been precisely what the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended when 
they so cautiously wrote it three decades earlier.”). 
293. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 82–83 (1990) (asserting that Brown 
should have been written “in terms of the original understanding” of the view that “equality, not 
separation was written into the text,” and “equality and segregation were mutually inconsistent, 
though the ratifiers did not understand that”); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the 
Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 954–55 (1995) (arguing, based on historical research 
focusing on votes and speeches by Congressional actors in the aftermath of passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, that, as a matter of originalism, Plessy was wrong and Brown was right).  
294. Jack M. Balkin, Preface, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID ix, 
x–xi (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001). 
295. See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
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Therefore, if Brown were actually correct as a matter of original 
meaning, Plessy would have been wrong under that interpretive theory.296 
That means an attempted demurrer that would cover both Dred Scott and 
Plessy would have to rest, instead, on the idea that the Constitution often 
does not give fixed, determinate answers and did not in those cases.297 On 
that view, the argument would go, the Dred Scott rulings could have been 
plausibly correct when rendered although the Reconstruction 
Amendments soon overruled them. And, as for Plessy, the argument 
would go, the ruling could have been plausibly correct when rendered but 
deemed clearly wrong today, although neither the relevant facts nor the 
relevant Constitutional language changed in the interim. 
The grounds to reject such a demurrer trace back to why Dred Scott 
and Plessy are the heart of constitutional law’s anti-canon—“the most 
important constitutional texts that we, the retrospective constructors of 
constitutional history, regard as normatively repulsive.”298 In the modern 
era, we have decided that it was unreasonable to say the things the Court 
said in those cases even when the Court said them.299 Although 
pronounced white hegemony prevailed in this country in those eras,300 we 
think the Court should have risen above forces that we understand as 
depraved, given that the Constitution gave the Court that authority. The 
Court’s function was not to enable a racial hierarchy through a delusion 
that black people were inferior and, thus, that there was no constitutional 
problem with their subjugation by force. By conforming to the widespread 
inhumanity of a maladapted society, the Court itself acted not reasonably, 
but wrongfully.301 
                                                   
453, 456 (2013) (noting that the “two core ideas” of originalism are that “the original meaning . . . of 
the constitutional text is fixed at the time each provision is framed and ratified” and that 
“constitutional actors . . . ought to be constrained by the original meaning”). 
296. See McConnell, supra note 293, at 954–55 (contending that only one of the two could have 
been correct as a matter of original meaning). 
297. See, e.g., GRABER, supra note 43, at 17 (asserting that constitutional law did not generate any 
clearly correct answers in Dred Scott); KLARMAN, JIM CROW, supra note 43, at 47 (asserting that in 
four areas of black subjugation during the Plessy era—“segregation, disenfranchisement, black jury 
service, and separate-and-unequal education—traditional sources of constitutional law were 
sufficiently indeterminate to accommodate white supremacists preferences”). 
298. Primus, supra note 9, at 254, n.41 (noting also that “the canon and the anti-canon are mutually 
constructing,” which suggests that rejection by a canonical text also may be part of what lands certain 
texts within the anti-canon). 
299. Cf. Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85 
B.U. L. REV. 677, 710 (2005) (contending that we want to conclude that Dred Scott and Plessy were wrongly 
decided because we do not want those decisions to “reflect our nature or who we are”). 
300. See id. (acknowledging that “we were once a nation premised on racial inequality and racial 
ideologies”).  
301. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 145 
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Once we reject as wrong even in those eras the brutal enforcement of 
white supremacy, the Dred Scott and Plessy opinions become incorrect 
when rendered. The wrongfulness in the Court’s behavior does not reside 
only in the rulings. In Dred Scott, the Court announced repeatedly that 
African Americans were inferior to white people and even declared 
African Americans essentially sub-human.302 In Plessy, the Court 
effectively declared that all African Americans were naturally inferior to 
all white people such that the law was powerless to make any 
correction.303 Simultaneously, the Plessy Court disingenuously declared 
that African Americans were only imagining that the Louisiana 
segregation law denigrated them.304 We can easily believe that the Court 
should have been better than to hold or utter those ideas. 
If we disavow the violent quest to enforce white domination as 
unreasonable even in the nineteenth century, the central rulings in both 
Dred Scott and Plessy also become wrong when rendered. The idea that 
those rulings were “correct” (although the Constitution did not require 
them) apparently would be that substantially different rulings would have 
been so widely resisted that the actual rulings avoided bad social ends.305 
But, what bad social outcomes did Dred Scott forestall?306 Promptly, the 
South seceded and the Civil War ensued, resulting in the deaths of 
750,000 people.307 (As for what the nation could then accept, the central 
Dred Scott rulings that slavery was permitted in federal territories and that 
black persons could not be citizens were repudiated by the Reconstruction 
Amendments only a decade later).308 And what more horrible social ends 
were avoided by Plessy’s holding approving de jure segregation of public 
facilities or other Plessy-era rulings that, for example, helped 
                                                   
(1994) (describing Plessy as a “ridiculous and shameful opinion”); Eisgruber, supra note 54, at 180 
(describing the Dred Scott decision as “profoundly immoral”). 
302. See supra notes 122–123 and accompanying text.   
303. See supra notes 186–189 and accompanying text.   
304. See supra notes 190–191 and accompanying text.   
305. See, e.g., GRABER, supra note 43, at 14 (asserting that “in 1860, the alternative to Dred Scott was 
a civil war that—with different battlefield accidents—might have further entrenched and expanded human 
bondage”); KLARMAN, supra note 43, at 21–22 (asserting, regarding Plessy, that “[r]ising white-on-black 
violence, including lynchings, made segregation seem . . . a progressive solution to growing interracial 
conflict”); KLARMAN, JIM CROW, supra note 43, at 58 (noting with respect to the Williams case, from 
1898, that “[d]isenfranchisement seemed preferable to racial massacres”).  
306. See MALTZ, supra note 68, at 155 (noting that the majority justices in Dred Scott “clearly 
misapprehended the impact their decision would have on the political disputes” of the time and did 
not avert tumult and Civil War). 
307. See Guy Gugliotta, New Estimate Raises Civil War Death Toll, N.Y. TIMES, April 2, 2012, at D1. 
308. See supra note 129. 
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disenfranchise African Americans? Contrary rulings would have been 
resisted in large swaths of the country until they were finally accepted or 
enforced and then followed.309 Whites may well not have suffered 
significantly except, perhaps, in some cases from the eventual limitations 
on their power to enjoy black subjugation. 
Even assuming that renewed civil conflict had erupted and whites had 
suffered greatly,310 why, if black lives mattered, would that have been a 
greater tragedy than the one inflicted for many decades on innocent 
African Americans and their supporters? There is no compelling reason. 
Moreover, the notion that life would have been even worse for African 
Americans with contrary rulings is impossible to substantiate and not 
intuitive.311 The road toward equality for African Americans undoubtedly 
would still have been long and torturous.312 Yet, once we see the quest to 
promote white hegemony even then as wrong, there was no sound basis 
for the Plessy Court to have surmised that it would be better for the nation 
as a whole or for African Americans in particular that the Court conspire 
in the endeavor. 
The final rejoinder concerns good faith ignorance. What if the rulings 
and pronouncements in Dred Scott and Plessy were based on honest 
unawareness by the Court as to the indecent implications?313 Ignorance, 
moral or otherwise, may be no better an explanation for the conduct of the 
majority justices than their balefulness or their fear of criticism and 
ostracism by those around them who were white supremacists.314 Given, 
                                                   
309. See, e.g., KLARMAN, JIM CROW, supra note 43, at 47–60 (explaining that contrary rulings by 
the Supreme Court on civil rights issues during the Plessy era would have been resisted in the South 
and largely unenforceable).  
310. See PACKARD, supra note 292, at 78 (asserting that had the Court ruled for Plessy, “it might 
have started another civil war” or “so it was feared”). 
311. The actual rulings, for example, did not avoid massacres of blacks by whites based on racial 
hatred. In the early twentieth century, there were various race riots in which whites destroyed black 
neighborhoods and killed many black residents. See ALFRED BROPHY, RECONSTRUCTING THE 
DREAMLAND: THE TULSA RACE RIOT OF 1921 (2002); JAMES S. HIRSCH, RIOT AND REMEMBRANCE 
(2002); ELLIOT RUDWICK, RACE RIOT AT EAST ST. LOUIS, JULY 2, 1917 (1966); ROBERTA SENECHAL, 
THE SOCIOGENESIS OF A RACE RIOT; SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS, IN 1908 (1990); WILLIAM M. TUTTLE, 
RACE RIOT: CHICAGO IN THE RED SUMMER OF 1919 (1972).   
312. See KLARMAN, JIM CROW, supra note 43, at 59 (concluding that “even enforceable Court 
decisions would have had relatively little effect on the lives of southern blacks.”). 
313. See, e.g., id. at 58 (“Justices in the Plessy era were too immersed in their historical context to 
spot the oppression that historical hindsight can readily see in racial practices at the turn of the 
twentieth century.”). But see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 562 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(asserting that the Louisiana law “practically[] puts the brand of servitude and degradation upon a 
large class of our fellow citizens”). 
314. Concluding that the majority justices were either ignorant or craven still allows us to 
recognize, as Jack Balkin argues we should, that anti-black racism was widely, even predominantly, 
considered “reasonable” in the United States during the Dred Scott and Plessy eras. See Balkin, supra 
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for example, that Frederick Douglas had published his compelling first 
autobiography in 1845,315 and that seventeen African Americans had been 
elected to and served in Congress between 1870 and 1887,316 the justices 
in Dred Scott and Plessy had no good excuse for ignorance about the full 
humanity and potential of humans of African descent. 
However, assuming that we should not treat those justices “as 
villains”317 (on the notion that they acted unknowingly), we can still 
properly look back on the Court’s behavior as wrong when committed. 
Consider a murder conviction that was based on weak evidence presented 
to a gullible (rather than malicious or cowardly) jury but is thrown out 
many years later when DNA evidence reveals the aged prisoner’s 
innocence. Was the conviction right until it was declared wrong or wrong 
all along? And which is preferable—that the reversing judge (1) throw out 
the conviction without addressing the prisoner and his family, friends and 
supporters, or (2) speak to the community with humility, admit that the 
conviction was always erroneous, acknowledge the many years of untold 
suffering by so many and apologize on behalf of the judiciary? 
B. The Argument that Contrary Rulings in Dred Scott and Plessy 
Would Not Have Alleviated Black Oppression 
Opponents may contend that the opinions in Dred Scott and Plessy at 
least did not significantly contribute to the subjugation and suffering of 
African Americans. As for Dred Scott, objectors might contend that the 
Civil War and Reconstruction Amendments promptly negated the 
importance of the decision. As for Plessy, objectors might urge that, had 
the opinion favored Plessy, it would not have been enforced or followed 
and African Americans would have endured just as much pain as they did 
in actuality. Some modern scholarship casts doubt on the importance of 
Dred Scott or Plessy in contributing significantly to the oppression of 
African Americans.318 Based on such contentions, objectors might also 
                                                   
note 299, at 710. 
315. See FREDERICK DOUGLAS, NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF FREDERICK DOUGLAS FREDERICK 
(Dover Thrift ed. 1995) (originally published as Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglas, an 
American Slave, by the Anti-Slave Office, Boston, 1845) (detailing the early life of Douglas, who 
escaped slavery and became a brilliant writer, eloquent orator and spokesperson for African 
Americans). 
316. See U.S. CONG., BLACK AMERICANS IN CONGRESS, 1870–1887, 22–25 (Matthew Wasniewski 
ed., 3d ed. 2008). 
317. KLARMAN, JIM CROW, supra note 43, at 6. 
318. See, e.g., LOFGREN, supra note 291, at 203–04 (contending that there is only slight evidence 
of Plessy’s direct role in promoting segregation); MALTZ, supra note 68, at 154 (noting that the Civil 
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argue that the decisions were not sufficiently causal regarding the injuries 
visited to warrant Supreme Court expiation. 
There are two answers. First, the no-causation argument is weak on its 
merits. Particularly as to Plessy, we can plausibly infer that, while there 
were non-judicial influences as well,319 the Court’s ruling, as opposed to 
a ruling strongly in their favor, made life significantly worse for African 
Americans.320 After all, the Plessy Court declared African Americans 
natively inferior and authorized their segregation in public settings, which 
served as a “public symbol[] and constant reminder[]” of their “inferior 
position.”321 No generally accepted account would allow the Court to deny 
that the decision helped stimulate the subsequent survival and burgeoning 
of segregation laws.322 By officially approving as opposed to denouncing 
the color-line, the ruling seems likely also to have encouraged the 
increasingly hostile attitudes and vicious behaviors that developed toward 
African Americans by many whites.323 Moreover, Plessy should not be 
considered apart from the Supreme Court’s other anti-black decisions 
from the post-bellum era, which reflected a “cumulative weakening in the 
resistance to racism.”324 (Dred Scott also may have had continuing ripples 
                                                   
War “clearly led to the demise of the constitutional doctrines embraced by” the majority justices in 
Dred Scott); see also KLARMAN, JIM CROW, supra note 43, at 60 (asserting, regarding the Plessy era, 
that “more favorable Court rulings, even if enforceable, would not have appreciably alleviated the 
oppression of southern blacks”). 
319. See, e.g., WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 54 (noting the influence on national attitudes about 
race of the U.S. assumption of control after 1898 of over eight million “people of the colored races” 
in the Caribbean and Pacific). 
320. See, e.g., GOLDSTONE, supra note 1, at 169 (“Plessy, then, was a fulcrum, a point of departure 
for southern states, immensely significant in the struggle for equal rights.”); HIGGINBOTHAM, supra 
note 1, at 115 (contending that Plessy “resulted in decades of blatant segregation of blacks in public 
settings” such that “the racial hierarchy was intensified and expanded, and segregation was given a 
false patina of judicial legitimacy”); WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 51–56 (noting the Supreme Court’s 
failure to support civil rights, including in Plessy, as one of several important factors in the South’s 
“adoption of extreme racism”). 
321. WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 7. 
322. In his dissent in Plessy, Justice Harlan had intuited that the decision would have such an effect. 
See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (predicting that the ruling 
would “encourage . . . state enactments [] to defeat the beneficent purposes” of the Reconstruction 
Amendments); see also JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 65 (1976) 
(contending that Plessy spurred more segregation laws between 1898 and 1907 affecting public 
transportation and also the extension of segregation laws in other areas); HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 
1, at 37 (“Plessy provided a catalyst for states to enforce segregation and inequality well beyond 
public accommodations.”).  
323. Justice Harlan had also intuited this consequence. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 560 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting) (predicting that the decision would “stimulate aggressions, more or less brutal and 
irritating, upon the admitted rights of colored citizens”).  
324. See GOLDSTONE, supra note 1, at 170 (noting that, while Plessy was unremarkable in the 
series, that was “the most damning thing about it,” given that the series could have been decided 
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of influence in the survival of notions of black inferiority.) Considering 
the series as a whole makes the lack-of-causation claim too counter-
intuitive to expect that anyone but proponents of that position should bear 
the burden of persuasion. And scholars who have raised doubts about the 
deleterious consequences of Plessy cannot disprove its influence.325 
Second, causation can easily be seen as a red herring. Based on 
longstanding principles that apply every day in criminal courts across the 
nation, complicity liability does not require causation.326 In criminal law, 
we do not absolve the aider and abettor for lack of proof that his 
encouragement of the target crime induced the principal actor.327 By 
encouraging the target offense, the accessory effectively steps into the 
shoes of the principal.328 Likewise, while the rule has critics and some 
states dissent, the accessory becomes fully liable for any other crimes of 
the principal that are the natural and probable consequence.329 Applying 
those principles to Dred Scott and Plessy, the target offense was the 
creation of the racial hierarchy and state-mandated segregation. The 
Supreme Court authorized and encouraged those outcomes and thereby 
became institutionally responsible. The natural and probable consequence 
was the deprivation and damage inflicted on African Americans not only 
through segregation but through the racial prejudice and hatred that it 
fomented. From this perspective, the argument that all of the segregation 
and the associated injuries would have happened anyway—even were it 
persuasive—is irrelevant. 
 
                                                   
differently); WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 53. 
325. Scholars who doubt Plessy’s impact have relied in part on the inability to prove the contrary 
position. See, e.g., KLARMAN, JIM CROW, supra note 43, at 48 (“measuring the effects of counterfactual 
judicial rulings is a daunting task”); LOFGREN, supra note 291, at 203–04 (suggesting that Plessy may have 
been one among several factors but arguing that proponents of that view cannot prove it). 
326. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 472 (7th ed. 2015) (“A secondary 
party is accountable for the conduct of the primary party even if his assistance was causally 
unnecessary to the commission of the offense.”). 
327. See id. (“S is guilty of an offense as an accomplice even if, but for his assistance, P would 
have committed the offense anyway.”). 
328. See id. (“The absence of a causation requirement is premised on the underlying 
rationale . . . that accomplice liability is derivative in nature.”). 
329. See id. at 479 (“At common law, and today in most jurisdictions, ‘a person encouraging or 
facilitating the commission of a crime [may] be held criminally liable not only for that crime, but for 
any other offense that was a ‘natural and probable consequence’ of the crime aided and abetted.’”). 
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C. The Argument that Confession and Apology Would Foster 
Unproductive Illusions of Redemption and Power 
Some may argue that Supreme Court confession and apology, by 
acknowledging and responding to black victimization, would mostly 
foster unproductive illusions of white redemption and black power. On 
this view, the effort would make those whites who read Supreme Court 
opinions feel badly about the racial hierarchy and Jim Crow such that they 
would try to deny their own responsibility, but still feel relieved that, if 
they bear any culpability for their white privilege, the Court’s apology 
provides redemption. As a consequence, they would gain little motivation 
to help advance black equality. Simultaneously, on this view, the effort 
would encourage African Americans, in the words of Shelby Steele, to 
pursue “a victim-focused racial identity.”330 That approach, Steele’s 
argument suggests, could involve “trading an illusion of power for an 
illusion of redemption.”331 From that vantage, the concern would be that 
African Americans might be misled to believe that they could secure full 
and just reparations “(with their illusion of deliverance) from the 
larger society.”332 
The answer to this dual-sided objection begins with clarifying what 
makes a Supreme Court confession and apology part of pursuing “careful 
and true development of equality between the races.”333 The risks of 
misunderstandings are real, because there can never be anything close to 
full redemption or full reparations for the consequences of the racial 
hierarchy and segregation.334 Among various problems, including 
resistance by the beneficiaries of black subjugation, we cannot adequately 
identify and evaluate who owes and who is owed and how much.335 Those 
problems haunt any effort to acknowledge and discuss our racial history 
and pursue reconciliation.336 Before yielding to these concerns, however, 
we should consider the benefit of the endeavor. 
                                                   
330. SHELBY STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED 4 (1994). 
331. Id. at 12. 
332. Id. at 9. 
333. Id. at xiii. 
334. For the argument for a non-comprehensive package of reparations for African Americans, 
involving monetary compensation, education programs, and transformational opportunities, see 
RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS (2000); see also BORIS BITKER, 
THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973) (focusing on Plessy as the basis for black reparations); 
Coates, supra note 19 (emphasizing decades of racist housing policy). 
335. See John McWhorter, Against Reparations, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY? 180, 191–93 
(Raymond A. Winbush ed., 2003) (noting, among other problems, the difficulty of defining what is 
owed and by whom and to whom). 
336. For a comprehensive view of the African American reparations debate, see ALFRED L. 
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The value of Supreme Court confession and apology finds explanation 
largely in the insight offered by Janine Young Kim that race, as a social 
and political construct,337 “is not purely cognitive but is also imbued with 
emotional meaning.”338 That reveals, as she has explained, that pursuing 
full equality between the races requires a reallocation and sharing at the 
emotional level, not merely within other realms, such as the material or 
the cognitive.339 Consider that because “unjust subordination is the 
paradigmatic condition of racial minorities in the United States,”340 the 
negative emotions of race can appropriately include “grief, anger, fear, 
hatred, and disgust” at times.341 Further, those negative emotions can 
“block the . . . positive feelings of joy, love, and even hope that each 
believe are attached to equal status.”342 To work toward equality requires 
changing the distribution of these emotions. After all, “part of being equal 
is feeling equal.”343 
Supreme Court confession and apology could help promote a 
reallocated sharing of the positive and negative emotions of race. By 
confessing the errors and harms of Dred Scott and Plessy and apologizing, 
the Court could convey respect, caring, and concern for the unjustly 
oppressed.344 That effort would aim to bring to all observers, including 
victims, “the feeling of joy in belonging, love in fellowship, and hope for 
a better future that, together with a fairer distribution of resources, 
constitute a comprehensive transformation of the racial condition in the 
United States.”345 At the same time, the confession and apology would 
aim “to assert . . . the humanity of blacks” and to “challenge . . . the 
humanity” 346 of those who might not otherwise consider the enormous 
                                                   
BROPHY, REPARATIONS PRO & CON (2006). 
337. See JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 104 (1962) (“Color is not a human or personal reality; 
it is a political reality.”); ALAIN LEROY LOCKE, RACE CONTACTS AND INTERRACIAL RELATIONS 5 (1992) 
(recognizing that “there is no stable physical basis for the sociological concept of race”).  
338. See Kim, supra note 18, at 497. 
339. See id. at 497–500. 
340. Id. at 490. 
341. Id. at 440. 
342. Id. at 498. 
343. Id. at 441 (emphasis in original).   
344. See ANA LUCIA ARAUJO, REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY AND THE SLAVE TRADE 5 (2017) (“A 
first step in the reparatory process requires that those who benefit from the wrongdoing offer an 
apology to those they victimized.”); HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 220–21 (urging the importance 
of “government . . . acknowledge[ment] [of] culpability in the racial paradigm” in any effort at racial 
reconciliation and the pursuit of equality). 
345. Kim, supra note 18, at 499. 
346. Id. at 499–500. 
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suffering caused by slavery, Jim Crow, and societal resistance to the idea 
of racial equality. “Rather than seeking to . . . divide,” it would “invite[] 
all to participate in a more ethical and just conception of 
collective  flourishing.”347 
The idea of stimulating a “desire for otherness”348—a desire to feel the 
negative emotions—is perhaps an under-appreciated part of pursuing 
racial equality. Yet this aspect appears intertwined with helping the 
oppressed move toward their rightful place in society. Michelle Alexander 
urges that all of us should feel shame over the parallels between Jim Crow 
(and slavery) and the modern black experience with mass incarceration 
based on drug laws349 so that we commit to “dismantling this new racial 
caste system.”350 James Cone wrote of the importance of white people 
striving “to empathize fully with the experience of black people”351 to 
“give voice to the victims” and, ultimately, to confront the sin of white 
supremacy and separate ourselves “from the culture that lynched 
blacks.”352 Michael Eric Dyson has urged that whites should educate 
themselves about black life and culture, including slavery and the black 
freedom struggle to help “close the distance between the white self and 
the black other.”353 And for the Supreme Court to express its concern and 
grief over Dred Scott and Plessy and the associated tragedies would 
“signal that this is not ‘just a black thing,” but rather “an 
American  thing.”354 
In the process of confessing and apologizing, the Court could also take 
steps to reduce misunderstandings. The Court could underscore—while 
also emphasizing the value of continuing efforts at redemption—the 
inability for various reasons to achieve full reparations for Dred Scott and 
Plessy, including the inability to identify and assess all of the injuries. 
Recognizing that there are many victims, including those who simply 
doubt the Court’s strong commitment to racial equality and human 
decency, the Court could apologize both to black victims and to all who 
have been fearful, troubled, or ashamed in the wake of learning about the 
Court’s history. Further, the Court could deliver the confession and 
                                                   
347. Id. at 500. 
348. Id. 
349. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 13 (2010) (urging an understanding of “the plight of African Americans” in “this 
new system of racialized social control” that “creates and maintains [a] racial hierarchy much as 
earlier systems of control did”). 
350. Id. at 11. 
351. CONE, supra note 16, at 41. 
352. Id. at 165. 
353. DYSON, supra note 15, at 199–206. 
354. Id. at 204–05. 
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apology in a context in which there is primarily a symbolic sacrifice by 
societal members that could be accepted not as divisive, but as the pursuit 
of a common flourishing. 
D. The Argument that the Court Would Have to Act Arbitrarily or Be 
Drawn into Undermining Its Own Credibility 
Objectors may assert that atonement inevitably would lead the Court 
either to act arbitrarily or to become mired in a quagmire of apologies, 
undermining public confidence in its legitimacy. On this view, the Court 
would appear unprincipled if it only apologized for Dred Scott and Plessy. 
Over history, the Court has rendered numerous decisions that have later 
been viewed by the vast majority of those who study them as wrong-
headed. What about other appalling, anti-black decisions from the 
antebellum era, such as Prigg,355 or from the post-bellum era, such as 
Pace, or Berea College?356 What about Lochner?357 What about 
Korematsu?358 What about the Court’s acquiescence in the criminalization 
of intimate, gay sexual encounters in Bowers v. Hardwick?359 And what 
about the Court’s historical treatment of Native Americans?360 If the Court 
is to begin confessing embarrassing errors and apologizing, the argument 
would proceed, it should atone for some or all of those decisions and 
several others as well. At the same time, the objection would continue, if 
the Court were to offer mea culpa after mea culpa, it could undermine the 
                                                   
355. For discussion of Prigg, see supra notes 110–119 and accompanying text. 
356. For discussion of Pace and Berea College, see supra notes 151–152, 181–182, and 
accompanying text. 
357. For discussion of the reasons that Lochner has been widely viewed in the modern era (although 
with an increase in libertarian dissent) as fundamentally erroneous, see Greene, supra note 9, at 417–22. 
358. For discussion of why Korematsu is difficult to defend using conventional constitutional 
arguments, see id. at 422–27. 
359. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“Bowers 
was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding 
precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”). 
360. Consider Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823). There, the Supreme Court declined to 
recognize title to land sold by an Indian tribe to a private person and declared that Native Americans 
had been “savages” who had no right to the land that warranted legal recognition. See id. at 590–91, 
604–05. We should not forget that “[a] long-established language of racism that speaks of the 
American Indian as an uncivilized, lawless, and warlike savage can be found at work throughout the 
leading Indian law decisions of the nineteenth-century U.S. Supreme Court.” ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, 
JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY 
OF RACISM IN AMERICA 33 (2005) (footnote omitted). 
Recent scholarly work has substantiated the widespread enslavement of indigenous people in our 
nation even after the middle of the nineteenth century. See ANDRÉS RESÉNDEZ, THE OTHER SLAVERY 
295–314 (2016). 
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public view that it operates mostly as a neutral interpreter of the 
Constitution. The perception might take hold that the justices in the past 
frequently made up the meaning of the document on bad reasoning and 
that the justices today must frequently do the same. 
The answer to this grievance begins with a simple denial that the Court 
must go deeply into the atonement business to atone for Dred Scott and 
Plessy. While the Court has made various decisions that later have been 
widely deemed erroneous,361 Dred Scott and Plessy are easily understood 
as warranting particular shame and special expiation.362 As we have seen, 
even among the Court’s anti-black decisions, Dred Scott and Plessy most 
openly dismissed the humanity of African Americans and endorsed the 
racial hierarchy.363 That is largely why they, along with Lochner, occupy 
the center of constitutional law’s anti-canon.364 But, even Lochner is a 
“less demonic precedent than Dred [Scott] and Plessy.”365 Not only do 
they seem distinctively depraved, the Court itself holds essentially all the 
power to decide which of its past decisions are so disgraceful as to warrant 
the institution’s most dramatic atonement. If the Court were to decide to 
confess and apologize only for Dred Scott and Plessy, there is little reason 
to think that major public campaigns would mount to press for many other 
Supreme Court atonements.366 
Without causing much further complication, however, the Court could 
cite Dred Scott and Plessy as representative of its anti-black decisions 
throughout most of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and 
apologize for that broader failing.367 In the process, the Court could 
acknowledge the associated harms, most of which it could still tie to its 
negative declarations about blacks and the endorsement of the racial 
hierarchy in Dred Scott and Plessy. In that way, the Court could 
effectively also apologize for decisions such as Prigg, Pace, and Berea 
College, among others. That approach would not require the Court to 
pursue the same level of atonement for all of its other rejected decisions 
that did not involve black subjugation. The Court’s historical debasement 
                                                   
361. See Greene, supra note 9, at 386–96 (discussing various Supreme Court cases that are widely 
thought to have been wrongly decided). 
362. See Savage, supra note 6 (noting that these two cases top the list of Supreme Court decisions 
widely regarded as the worst of all time). 
363. See supra notes 120–128, 183–189, and accompanying text. 
364. See Amar, Plessy v. Ferguson, supra note 9, at 76 (asserting that those three occupy “the 
lowest circle of constitutional hell”). 
365. Id. at 81. 
366. Would confessing and apologizing once for Dred Scott and Plessy foment calls for the Court 
to do the same thing repeatedly? While some repetition might be good, it seems doubtful that the 
Court would face problematic pressure of this nature.  
367. See supra text accompanying notes 129–228. 
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of black people and the associated injuries to them and all who have 
suffered vicariously are plausibly understood as the institution’s most 
dishonorable legacy.368 
Would Supreme Court atonement for Dred Scott and Plessy alone (or 
in their representative capacities) tend to undermine the Court’s 
legitimacy by effectively revealing that the Court creates constitutional 
meaning? This concern seems overwrought. Dred Scott and Plessy are 
already widely recognized among those who pay attention to Supreme 
Court opinions and history as severely misguided. For the Court to 
acknowledge that they were erroneous decisions that endorsed unjust and 
destructive propositions would only catch up with, rather than challenge, 
that informed, popular opinion. Nor is it demonstrably bad that more 
citizens understand that the Supreme Court must often construct, rather 
than merely discern and apply, constitutional doctrines.369 
IV. PURSUING ATONEMENT WHILE LIMITING THE 
DEATH  PENALTY 
Having addressed why the Supreme Court should atone for Dred Scott 
and Plessy, this Article posits that abolishing the death penalty for 
aggravated murder would provide an appropriate context to do so. This 
Part offers three reasons, besides the availability of a plausible approach 
for the Court to implement such a plan as constitutional law, which is the 
subject of Part VI. First, abolition is relevant to atonement. Studies 
concerning racial discrimination in capital selection and parallels between 
modern executions and Jim Crow-era lynchings provide grounds to 
understand the modern application of the death penalty as both a product 
                                                   
368. Cf. David Brooks, Opinion, The Case for Reparations, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2019, at A27 
(contending that the continuing effects of the racial hierarchy represent a national social crisis). 
369. See JAMES E. FLEMING, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION: FOR MORAL READINGS 
AND AGAINST ORIGINALISMS xi (2015) (defending “conceptions of the Constitution as embodying 
abstract moral and political principles—not codifying concrete historical rules or practices—and of 
interpretation of those principles as requiring normative judgments about how they are best 
understood”). See also Scott W. Howe, Slavery As Punishment: Original Public Meaning, Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment, and the Neglected Clause in the Thirteenth Amendment, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 983, 
1034 (2009) (concluding that the “slavery-as-punishment clause should remind all of us why [the] 
original public meaning, even when clear, does not resolve the modern meaning of the constitution”); 
Lawrence Rosenthal, An Empirical Inquiry into the Use of Originalism: Fourth Amendment 
Jurisprudence During the Career of Justice Scalia, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 75, 75 (2019) (determining that 
during Justice Scalia’s career, “less than 14% of the opinions of the Court addressing a disputed 
question of Fourth Amendment law were originalist”); Solum, supra note 295, at 458 (contending 
that, even from a perspective focused on finding original meaning, “the actual text of the U.S. 
Constitution contains general, abstract, and vague provisions that require constitutional construction 
for their application to concrete constitutional cases”). 
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and perpetuation of the violent, white hegemony that the Court abetted in 
Dred Scott and Plessy.370 The second reason likewise focuses on the 
relevance of abolition but also on the questionable utility of the death 
sanction. Modern capital punishment has such modest penological value 
when applied to aggravated murder as to further imply that it would 
already have disappeared had it not gained earlier momentum as an 
outgrowth of and instrument for maintaining the racial hierarchy.371 The 
final reason addresses whether abolition of the death penalty for 
aggravated murder would have enough positive impact on African 
Americans and their supporters to underscore sincere judicial atonement. 
The answer is that prompt abolition would not only eliminate racial 
discrimination in the use of the death penalty but could also have 
important symbolic value even apart from the opportunity that such a 
course poses for achieving the secondary benefits of apologizing for Dred 
Scott and Plessy.372 
A. Linkage Between the Death Penalty and the Color-Line 
The central argument for focusing on partial abolition of capital 
punishment as the vehicle for atonement is that the modern death penalty 
appears to have descended from the country’s quest for white 
supremacy.373 Many students of the death penalty have asserted this 
integral connection, including prominent leaders of the African-American 
community.374 The conclusion that the death penalty links to the 
maintenance of the color-line rests heavily on evidence that the death 
penalty in the post-Furman era has continued to be applied in a racialized 
fashion, even if less so than in the Jim Crow era.375 The point (for present 
purposes) is not that the death penalty is unfair to some but not all guilty 
murderers who receive it, or to some but not all murder victims whose 
killers fail to receive it,376 but rather that the death penalty doubtfully 
would exist as a punishment for aggravated murder today in the United 
States absent the long, brutal quest to subjugate blacks and maintain white 
                                                   
370. See infra text accompanying notes 373–413. 
371. See infra text accompanying notes 414–432. 
372. See infra text accompanying notes 433–444. 
373. See Austin Sarat, The Rhetoric of Race in the “New Abolitionism,” in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO 
THE KILLING STATE 260, 264 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2006) (“Criticism of capital 
punishment should focus on the work it does as a living embodiment of the legacy of lynching and 
the system of white privilege that it expressed.”). 
374. See supra notes 20, 27, and accompanying text. 
375. See infra notes 379–404 and accompanying text. 
376. The racial disparities also reveal a separate “inequality” aspect of unfairness regarding the 
death penalty for murder. See infra notes 465–474 and accompanying text. 
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supremacy. Additional evidence to support that conclusion comes from 
research that shows corresponding state patterns in the relative levels of 
use of lynching in the Plessy era as compared to the relative levels of use 
in modern times of the death penalty.377 Thus, focusing on limited 
abolition of the death penalty as the context for Supreme Court expiation 
builds on the constitutive tie between the violence associated historically 
with maintaining the judicially sanctioned color-line and the racialized 
state violence embodied in the modern death penalty.378 This linkage 
makes limited abolition a germane context in which to atone for Dred 
Scott and Plessy. 
1. Racialized Use of the Modern Death Penalty 
Many studies of capital sentencing combine to suggest that the racial 
hierarchy that the Court endorsed in Dred Scott and Plessy is crucial in 
explaining the survival of death as a sanction for murder in the modern 
era.379 With high consistency, studies have shown pronounced white-
victim favoritism by capital decision-makers.380 Evidence of the operation 
of prejudice against African-American capital defendants is more 
equivocal,381 although some studies have shown that influence as well.382 
The studies also have taken place in enough states to conclude that race 
                                                   
377. See ZIMRING, supra note 20, at 66 (noting the correlation between high and low lynching states 
“at the dawn of the 20th Century” and the high and low execution states “late in the twentieth century”). 
378. Kaufman-Osborn, supra note 20, at 49 (contending that “the administration of capital 
punishment in the United States, like the practice of lynching, is one of the state practices by means 
of which the racial polity is reproduced”); Sarat, supra note 373, at 273 (asserting that “the death 
penalty itself perpetuates prejudice, discrimination, and racial subordination”). 
379. See LINDA E. CARTER, ELLEN S. KREITZBERG & SCOTT W. HOWE, UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT LAW 364 (4th ed. 2018) (asserting the prevalence of race discrimination in capital 
selection and noting some of the supporting studies); Catherine M. Grosso et al., Race Discrimination 
and the Death Penalty: An Empirical and Legal Overview, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 525–76 (Charles S. Lanier, Robert Bohm & James Acker eds., 3rd ed. 2014) (discussing 
various studies); David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination in the Administration 
of the Death Penalty: An Overview of the Empirical Evidence with Special Emphasis on the Post-
1990 Research, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 194 (2003) (summarizing various studies). 
380. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH 
INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 6 (1990) (study based on synthesizing twenty-eight other 
studies and concluding that race-of-victim bias typically strongly influences capital selection). 
381. See id. (asserting that race-of-defendant bias is typically more equivocal or not identifiable). 
382. See, e.g., Scott W. Howe, The Futile Quest for Racial Neutrality in Capital Selection and the Eighth 
Amendment Argument for Abolition Based on Unconscious Racial Discrimination, 45 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 2083, 2118–19 (2004) (summarizing studies finding discrimination against black defendants and black 
victims); Scott Phillips, Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 807, 
837–39 (2008) (study regarding capital selection in Harris County, Texas, finding that black defendants and 
killers of white victims were disfavored in the overall selection process). 
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bias has continued to play a central role in the use of the capital sanction 
generally in the United States.383 
The most famous of the post-Furman studies, conducted by lead 
investigator David Baldus, focused on the Georgia system in the 1970s 
and was the basis for the separate challenges under the Equal Protection 
Clause and the Eighth Amendment that the Supreme Court rejected in 
McCleskey v. Kemp.384 For all suspects charged with murder in Georgia 
between 1973 and 1979, the Baldus researchers found the following 
death-sentencing rates in four categories of race-of-defendant and race-
of-victim combinations: 
 
Race of Defendant & Victim Death-Sentencing Rate: 
black defendant/white victim .21 (50/233) 
white defendant/white victim .08 (58/748) 
black defendant/black victim .01 (18/1443) 
white defendant/black victim .03 (2/60) 
TOTAL. 05 (128/2488)385 
 
Those skewed figures went far on their own to substantiate that the 
flames of prejudice that the Court fanned in Dred Scott and Plessy 
continued to play a central role in explaining the operation of Georgia’s 
post-Furman death-penalty system. Nonetheless, one could postulate—
however unlikely given our history of racial animus386—that unapparent, 
legitimate factors might correlate with the racial factors to explain the 
Georgia capital-sentencing outcomes. To test that hypothesis, the Baldus 
researchers investigated 230 variables for each case and each defendant 
and employed sophisticated statistical techniques, including cross-
tabulations and multivariate regression analysis.387 They found no 
combination of legitimate variables that could come close to explaining 
the results.388 They concluded that the figures reflected what they seemed 
                                                   
383. See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE: HOW KILLING THE DEATH PENALTY CAN 
REVIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 84 (2017) (asserting that “study after study in nearly every death penalty 
state” shows a race-of-victim influence). 
384. See DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL JUSTICE AND 
THE DEATH PENALTY 3 (1990) [hereinafter BALDUS STUDY] (noting that the study provided the basis for 
litigation over the claim of racial discrimination in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)). 
385. See id. at 315 tbl.50. 
386. See, e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting the need to consider 
our racial history in assessing the plausible explanations for the disparities). 
387. See BALDUS STUDY, supra note 384, at 46. 
388. See id. at 316. 
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to reflect—virulent prejudice by decision-makers, whether conscious 
or  not.389 
The Baldus study indicated that race powerfully influenced case 
outcomes. The researchers estimated that the odds were 4.3 times higher 
that a defendant would receive the death penalty solely because his victim 
was white rather than black.390 In part because the vast majority of 
murders were intra-racial and, as in the Jim Crow era, there was often less 
intense pursuit of the maximum punishment in cases involving black 
victims,391 black defendants had a modest advantage over white 
defendants across all cases.392 Nonetheless, within white-victim cases, the 
researchers estimated that a black defendant faced odds of receiving the 
death penalty 2.4 times higher solely because he was black rather than 
white.393 Thus, the odds of a death sentence facing a black defendant who 
killed a white victim were many times higher than those facing a white 
defendant who killed a black victim under otherwise 
identical  circumstances. 
Various subsequent studies of modern capital selection in many 
jurisdictions have consistently confirmed the operation of racial 
prejudices, including several studies conducted in the last decade.394 A 
study in the state of Washington recently found that “juries are more than 
four times as likely to impose a death sentence in cases involving Black 
defendants (after controlling for case characteristics).”395 A recent study 
in Louisiana revealed “racial disparities even more striking than the 
Georgia disparities the Court tolerated in its McCleskey decision.”396 A 
2013 California study found major disparities favoring white victims in 
charging decisions in murder cases between the North and South of 
                                                   
389. See id. 
390. See id. 
391. See supra notes 215–216. 
392. See BALDUS STUDY, supra note 384, at 328. 
393. See id.  
394. See supra notes 395–401 and accompanying text. 
395. Katherine Beckett & Heather Evans, Race, Death, and Justice: Capital Sentencing in 
Washington State, 1981-2014, 6 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 77, 103–04 (2016). 
396. STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 11, at 110; see also Frank R. Baumgartner & Tim Lyman, 
Race-of-Victim Discrepancies in Homicides and Executions, Louisiana 1976-2015, 17 LOY. J. PUBLIC 
INT. L. 129, 141 (2015) (finding that, in Louisiana, “the likelihood of being executed for [killing an 
African-American male] in th[e] modern era is forty-eight times lower than for the killing of a white 
woman”); Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Death Sentencing in East Baton Rouge Parish, 
1990–2008, 71 LA. L. REV. 647, 670–71 (2011) (finding that in an urban Louisiana parish, “the odds 
of a death sentence are 97% higher for those who kill whites than for those who kill blacks”).   
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Alameda County.397 A study from North Carolina, published in 2011, 
found that “the odds of a death sentence for those . . . suspected of killing 
Whites are approximately three times higher than the odds of a death 
sentence for those suspected of killing Blacks.”398 The studies are not 
always as sophisticated as the original Baldus study;399 they do not 
consistently find race-of-defendant prejudice;400 and they vary on whether 
it is the prosecutors or juries who discriminate.401 Nonetheless, the 
implication from the combined studies that racial prejudice influences 
capital selection on a broad geographic scale is powerful. 
The combined racial studies also tend to substantiate that the death 
penalty for aggravated murder in the United States would have altogether 
or nearly disappeared by now if we had never had the color-line. 
Considered alone, those studies do not prove the point beyond doubt. The 
death penalty has survived although the studies also show that its use in 
the post-Furman era is substantially less racialized than was capital 
selection during the Jim Crow era.402 The countervailing point, however, 
is that overall use of the death penalty also has dwindled in recent 
decades.403 That could mean that to the extent that racism has moderated 
and that there is increased concern with consistency and fairness 
(including the desire to avoid executing the innocent),404 there is less 
                                                   
397. See Steven F. Shatz & Terry Dalton, Challenging the Death Penalty with Statistics: Furman, 
McCleskey, and a Single County Case Study, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1227, 1229–30 (2013). 
398. Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Death Sentencing in North Carolina, 1980-
2007, 89 N.C. L. REV. 2119, 2145 (2011). 
399. See, e.g., Howe, supra note 382, at 2111 (noting various studies that were not as thorough as 
the original Baldus study). 
400. See, e.g., Pierce & Radelet, supra note 396, at 670 (noting that “the race of the defendant had 
no value in predicting who is sentenced to death”).  
401. Compare, e.g., Phillips, supra note 382, at 830, 834 (in Houston, prosecutors but not juries 
discriminate), with Beckett & Evans, supra note 395, at 103–04 (in Washington state, juries rather 
than prosecutors are the problem). 
402. Compare, for example, the statistics from the original Baldus study in Georgia, see supra note 
385 and accompanying text, with the statistics regarding the use of the death penalty for rape in the 
Jim Crow era. See supra notes 283–284 and accompanying text. See also David C. Baldus et. al., 
Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Challenge to State 
Supreme Courts, 15 STETSON L. REV. 133, 158–61 (1986) (asserting that “by and large, the evidence 
of race-of-defendant discrimination, particularly the most recent evidence, is neither strong nor 
consistent” and that there was a “strong and systematic bias against black defendants” in the “pre-
Furman sentencing patterns in the South”). 
403. See infra notes 424–430 and accompanying text. 
404. In the modern era, “the rhetorical center of abolitionist argument has come to focus less on 
race and more on claims of actual innocence.” Sarat, supra note 373, at 263. However, the modern 
concern with innocence as an argument against capital punishment can be understood as connected 
to a reduction in racism. In the Jim Crow context, when the state-imposed death penalty was replacing 
lynching, the guilt of the defendant often did not matter. See Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins 
of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48, 57 (2000). Just as “the purpose of a lynching 
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interest in using the death penalty. On that view, the suspicion remains 
from the totality of racial studies that our history of white hegemony is 
integral to the continuing existence of the death penalty where it has not 
yet disappeared. The inference is also made difficult to refute by the 
counter-factual nature of any reimagining of our past and present without 
the racial hierarchy that the Court abetted, rather than eschewed, in Dred 
Scott and Plessy. 
2. Modern Executions and Jim Crow-Era Lynchings 
The parallels between patterns of modern executions and patterns of 
Jim Crow-era lynchings also help substantiate that without the violently 
enforced color-line, capital punishment for aggravated murder would not 
have survived in the United States. In a study published in 2003, Franklin 
Zimring found that states with high lynching rates from 1889 to 1968405 
tended to be high execution states between 1977 and 2000.406 He also 
found that states that had abandoned the death penalty tended to be states 
with low or minimal lynching rates from 1889 to 1968.407 Those findings 
                                                   
usually was to ensure black subordination rather than to punish guilt,” death-penalty trials in that 
context “had little to do with establishing factual guilt or innocence.” Id. 
405. Regarding lynching, Zimring ranked states according to their absolute number of lynchings 
for two periods: 1889 to 1918 and 1882 to 1968. See ZIMRING, supra note 20, at 208, tbl.A.1. There 
were only minor ranking variances between states for these two periods. See id. For the full 1889 to 
1968 period, the top fourteen states ranked as follows: (1) Mississippi; (2) Georgia; (3) Texas; 
(4) Louisiana; (5) Alabama; (6) Arkansas; (7) Florida; (8) Tennessee; (9) Kentucky; (10) South 
Carolina; (11 and 12) Missouri and Oklahoma (tie); (13) North Carolina; (14) Virginia. See id. For 
the full 1889 to 1968 period, the bottom fourteen states ranked as follows: (31) Idaho; (32) Iowa; 
(33) North Dakota; (34) Minnesota; (35, 36, and 37) Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Utah (tie); 
(38) Nevada and Wisconsin (tie); (40 and 41) New Jersey and New York (tie); (42) Delaware, Maine, 
and Vermont (tie). See id. 
406. See id. at 95–96. 
407. Zimring provided a chart that roughly summarized the correlations: 
 
          Executions 1977—2000 in High-versus Low-Lynching States 
 
                 14                         Execution                14                    Execution 
          High-Lynching             Records           Low-Lynching        Records 
            States                      1997-2000              States                1997-2000      
          Alabama                          23                  Connecticut              None 
          Arkansas                          23                  Delaware                  11 
          Florida                             50                   Maine                      None* 
          Georgia                            23                   Massachusetts         None* 
          Kentucky                           2                   Michigan                 None* 
          Louisiana                         26                   Minnesota               None* 
          Mississippi                        4                   Nevada                       8 
          Missouri                          46                   New Hampshire       None 
          North Carolina                16                   New Jersey               None 
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suggest408 that an important explanation for lynching during the Jim Crow 
era—enforcement of the racial hierarchy409—is also important in 
explaining the survival of capital punishment through the twentieth 
century. That view also conforms with evidence of a transition from 
lynchings toward mob-dominated, death penalty trials—essentially sham 
proceedings—in the Jim Crow regions in an effort to give a legal veneer 
to what still amounted to racial subjugation through violence.410 Zimring 
noted that the “saga of lynching” was linked to “racial repression” and 
that “the lynching tradition as a[n] historical institution . . . seems to have 
lasting influence on capital punishment in parts of the United States.”411 
He found it “likely” that the history of a “coercive white supremacist 
context” is central to the explanation for the “willingness to execute” in 
those states in which capital punishment has survived most vigorously.412 
With particular concern for the brutal violence associated with the color-
line, that conclusion underscores the relevance of substantial abolition of 
the death penalty as a vehicle for judicial atonement.413 
                                                   
          Oklahoma                        30                   New York                None 
          South Carolina                25                   Pennsylvania              3 
          Tennessee                          1                   Rhode Island            None* 
          Texas                             239                   Vermont                   None* 
          Virginia                            81                  Wisconsin                 None* 
           *No death penalty in effect throughout the period. 
See id. at 95, tbl.5.1.  
408. Given the rankings on lynching, the comparisons in Zimring’s chart, see supra note 407, reflect 
some inconsistencies, although the overall picture remains one of positive correlation. Mississippi, for 
example, ranked as first in historical lynchings but had few modern executions. Likewise, some of the other 
historically high-lynching states—for example, Kentucky and Tennessee—were not high-execution states 
in the modern era. Further, some of the historically low-lynching states—for example, Delaware and 
Nevada—had more executions in the modern era than one might have expected. Zimring noted some of the 
non-symmetries. See ZIMRING, supra note 20, at 117. 
Developments since 2003 have reduced some of the seeming anomalies among the historically low-
lynching states. Delaware has abolished the death penalty. See Carter et. al., supra note 379, at 483. 
It is also noteworthy that Nevada has not executed anyone since 2006, and Pennsylvania has not 
executed anyone since 1999. See Death Penalty Information, supra note 35. 
409. See supra notes 219–228 and accompanying text; see also Klarman, supra note 404, at 57 
(noting that, well into era of Jim Crow in the South, the “purpose of a lynching usually was to ensure 
black subordination rather than to punish guilt”).  
410. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 404, at 55–57 (noting that the decline in lynchings in the 1920s 
appeared dependent on their replacement by such state-run exercises and concluding that “the state-
imposed death penalty in these cases was little more than a formalization of the lynching process”). 
411. ZIMRING, supra note 20, at 90. 
412. Id. at 116–17. 
413. An additional symmetry would also favor the abolition proposal. Given Zimring’s findings, 
partial abolition would tend to have the most direct impact (in eliminating death sentences) in the 
states that had the most lynchings. The proposal would also eliminate the federal death penalty for 
murder and, in that sense, apply nation-wide to a small number of death sentences. Yet that outcome 
also appears appropriate in that lynching, while very much a regional malady, was also “a national 
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B. Dubious Utility of the Penalty Absent a Racialized Polity 
An examination of death penalty rationales further shows that abolition 
of the capital sanction for aggravated murder bears relevance to the 
Court’s decisions in Dred Scott and Plessy. The generally unstated and 
improper rationale seems to be the punishment’s role in honoring “the 
Racial Contract”—the imbedded understanding among most whites that 
whites are the people who matter.414 The privileging of whiteness is 
usually tacit in the death-selection process and almost always in public 
discussions about the benefits of capital punishment.415 The implicit 
nature of this understanding has aided the perpetuation of the sanction by 
conferring deniability of invidious purpose.416 However, the modern death 
penalty is of questionable legitimate utility in the United States,417 which 
suggests that it survives in important measure because it has long been 
valued, at least subconsciously, for its symbolic reminder of the violence 
available and the willingness to use it to maintain the racial hierarchy. 
Consider the spoken rationales for capital punishment: desert and 
deterrence.418 Under those two theories, it is the marginal value of the 
death penalty over the maximum alternative punishment—perpetual 
imprisonment—that matters.419 However, the death penalty for 
                                                   
practice,” indeed, “a practice that helped define the boundaries of the nation.” ASHRAF H.A. RUSHDY, 
AMERICAN LYNCHING ix (2012). For example, Congress repeatedly failed to enact proposed anti-
lynching legislation “throughout the lynching era,” even if that was largely because “Southern white 
representatives predictably and consistently protested so-called federal interference in local affairs.” 
EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE’S REPORT ON LYNCHING, supra note 20, at 81. 
414. CHARLES W. MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT 3 (1997). 
415. See, e.g., Kaufman-Osborn, supra note 20, at 46 (noting that “executions are now performed 
not in the name of white hegemony but in the name of a citizenry that, as liberalism requires, is 
abstract in the sense of without color.”). 
416. See id. at 48–49 (asserting that the importation of “practices constitutive of due process” in 
the capital-selection process masks “the continued articulation of the racial contract within a polity 
that no longer espouses the rhetoric of white supremacy.”); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292–
97 (1987) (rejecting equal protection challenge resting on statistical evidence of discrimination 
because of the absence of evidence that any of the decision-makers in capital case “acted with a 
discriminatory purpose”). Cf. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: 
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1379–83 
(1988) (asserting, in the civil-rights context, that the elimination of race conscious laws does not 
eliminate racism but “creates the illusion that racism is no longer the primary factor responsible” for 
racially disparate outcomes).   
417. See infra notes 418–432 and accompanying text.   
418. See Richard O. Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the 
Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1177, 1178–79 (1981). 
419. See, e.g., CARTER ET. AL., supra note 379, at 10 (noting that, regarding deterrence, the 
marginal effect is what matters). 
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aggravated murder is carried out so infrequently and arbitrarily, and so 
long after the crime, that skepticism has long existed over its deterrent 
value.420 Those problems also undermine the notion that the death penalty 
represents appropriate deserts, as does the evidence that racial bias affects 
death selection.421 We have no way to plausibly determine in non-
racialized terms that certain people “deserve” the death penalty when 
“[t]he social meaning of murder . . . comes to vary systematically with the 
races of those involved.”422 The idea of deserved death sentences, 
uninfluenced by race, seems especially fanciful when almost all of the 
worst murderers escape that sanction.423 
The rationalizations for capital punishment have become even more 
problematic in the last two decades due to the reduced, fragmented, and 
halting use of the sanction.424 Out of the several thousand persons who 
annually commit a murder in the United States, the total number who 
received a death sentence fell to 42 in 2018, down from 295 in 1998.425 
                                                   
420. See, e.g., Jack Greenberg, Against the American System of Capital Punishment, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 1670, 1670 (1986) (“I submit that this system is deeply incompatible with the proclaimed 
objectives of death penalty proponents.”); Lempert, supra note 418, at 1225 (concluding that “the 
renewed effort to punish by death cannot withstand . . . scrutiny” on either desert or deterrence 
theories); see also BARRY NAKELL & KENNETH A. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH 
PENALTY 1, 161 (1987) (noting the rarity of a death sentence and ultimately concluding that, because 
of its arbitrariness, “the Court should no longer permit it to be carried out”). 
421. See supra notes 379–404 and accompanying text; Lempert, supra note 418, at 1184–85 
(asserting that a desert theory cannot justify distributing capital punishment in “an invidious or 
inconsistent fashion”). 
422. Michael Cholbi & Alex Madva, Black Lives Matter and the Call for Death Penalty Abolition, 
128 ETHICS 517, 519 (2018) (emphasis omitted).   
423. See, e.g., John Blume et al., Explaining Death Row’s Population and Racial Composition, 1 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 165, 172 tbl.1 (2004) (noting that the death-sentencing rate among murder 
arrestees in Georgia from 1977 to 1999 was 0.022—243 death sentences out of 10,912 murder 
arrestees). 
If capital punishment had modest value based on the spoken rationales of desert and deterrence, 
evidence that death sentences are much more expensive than sentences of perpetual imprisonment 
would still weigh against it as a social policy. See, e.g., CARTER ET. AL., supra note 379, at 10 
(summarizing the policy debate and the many studies concluding that a death sentence costs 
substantially more than a sentence of life imprisonment without parole). 
424. See generally Glossip v. Gross, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2759–70 (2015) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
425. The following chart shows the twenty-one-year decline: 
 
      Year:          1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007   
      Sentences:    295    279    223    153   166     151    138    140    123   126 
 
     Year:           2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  2017 
      Sentences:    120   118    114      85      82       83     74       49      31     39 
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(Essentially all murders are constitutionally death-eligible, given that, 
while the Court also has required the finding of an “aggravating 
circumstance,” there is expansive latitude on what is aggravating and on 
the number of possible aggravators a state can specify.426) Death sentences 
also now are largely concentrated in only a few counties, even within 
states that retain the death penalty.427 In addition, twenty-two states plus 
the District of Columbia have abolished capital punishment, with ten 
having jettisoned it in the last twenty years.428 Moreover, among the 
twenty-eight states that retain the death penalty, nine have not executed 
anyone in more than a decade, and fifteen have not executed anyone since 
2012.429 Gavin Newsome, the governor of California, which has the 
largest death row, also recently declared a moratorium on executions in 
that state.430 We also should acknowledge that, between 2004 and 2014, 
the average delay between sentencing and execution grew from 
approximately eleven years to approximately eighteen years.431 Given 
those developments, any claim that our actual capital punishment system 
legitimately serves desert and deterrence goals warrants 
extreme  skepticism.432 
                                                   
 
     Year:           2018   
      Sentences:      42 
See Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 35, at 3. 
426. See generally Scott W. Howe, Repudiating the Narrowing Rule in Capital Sentencing, 2012 
BYU L. REV. 1477, 1482–1503. See also EVAN J. MANDERY, A WILD JUSTICE: THE DEATH AND 
RESURRECTION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 362 (2013) (noting that the post-Furman, 
death-penalty statute from Georgia that the Supreme Court first upheld in 1976 has ten aggravating 
circumstances that cover almost all murders). 
427. See Glossip, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. at 2774 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing data to support 
conclusion that “the number of active death penalty counties is small and getting smaller”). 
428. The twenty-three jurisdictions without the death penalty, with the year of abolition or judicial 
rejection in parentheses, are: Alaska (1957); Colorado (2020); Connecticut (2012); Delaware (2016); 
District of Columbia (1981); Hawaii (1957); Illinois (2011); Iowa (1965); Maine (1887); Maryland 
(2013); Massachusetts (1984); Michigan (1847); Minnesota (1911); New Hampshire (2019); New 
Jersey (2007); New Mexico (2009); New York (2007); North Dakota (1973); Rhode Island (1984); 
Vermont (1972); Washington (2018); West Virginia (1965); Wisconsin (1853). See DEATH PENALTY 
INFO. CTR., State By State, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state 
[https://perma.cc/N5BK-VGLU]. 
429. See id.  
430. See Opinion, A Pause for California’s Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 2019, at A26 
(noting that the governor’s order granted temporary reprieves to 737 condemned inmates). 
431. See Glossip, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. at 2764 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
432. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Following Finality: Why Capital Punishment Is Collapsing Under 
Its Own Weight, in FINAL JUDGMENTS: THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE 30, 
49 (Austin Sarat ed., 2017) (“The dramatic decline in death sentences and executions . . . has 
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Recognizing the problems with the rationales for capital punishment as 
it actually operates has two pertinent implications. First, the problems 
imply that another rationale, less pleasing, has helped explain capital 
punishment where it has not already crumbled. That conclusion hints, 
again, that the explanation centers on our sordid history of Court-
endorsed, racial oppression. Second, the problems imply that our current 
system of capital punishment lacks much legitimate social value. This 
lack of value means that abolishing the sanction for murder would entail 
minimal social costs. 
C. The Potential Value of Abolition to Convey Sincerity 
The third reason to use partial abolition to pursue atonement is its 
potential value, largely symbolic, in underscoring the Court’s sincerity. 
By expressly acknowledging capital punishment’s heritage in racial 
intimidation, the Court could imbue a decision announcing abolition with 
support for African-American humanity and equality whether or not the 
Court also included a forceful apology for Dred Scott and Plessy. If 
abolishing the death penalty for aggravated murder could stand alone as a 
decision conveying such an important message, it could also appropriately 
accentuate the Court’s bona fides in pursuing expiation. 
Some critics might assert that under-enforcement in black-victim 
murder cases is the primary discrimination problem with the death penalty 
today.433 They might urge that the Court would do better to respect 
African Americans by continuing to try to increase the proportional use 
of the death penalty in black-victim cases. Without minimizing continuing 
discrimination, these critics could correctly note that a positive 
redistribution of death sentences has occurred since the Jim Crow era.434 
Even some whites who have committed racial-hatred murders against 
blacks in the modern era have received the death penalty, which sends a 
message that black lives matter, too.435 Thus, abolishing the death penalty 
                                                   
substantially negated the penological justifications that supported the death penalty in the first 
place.”). 
433. See, e.g., Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the 
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L REV. 1388, 1436 (1988) (arguing that states could “level-up,” meaning 
that they could increase the proportion of death sentences in black-victim murder cases); id. at 1436–
39 (reiterating that leveling up is a viable solution); KENNEDY, supra note 138, at 344–45 (reiterating 
that leveling up is plausible). 
434. See supra note 402 and accompanying text. 
435. In terms of infamy, two cases would appear near the top of any such list. In Texas, two white 
supremacists were executed for the brutal, race-hatred, killing in 1998 of an African American, James 
Byrd, Jr. See Campbell Robertson, Texas Executes Man for 1998 Dragging Death, N.Y. TIMES, April 
25, 2019, at A18. Also, in federal court in South Carolina, a white supremacist was sentenced to death 
in 2017 for killing nine African-American churchgoers in Charleston, South Carolina in 2015. See 
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for murder now, these critics might assert, would amount to eliminating a 
valuable public commodity just as it is beginning to be distributed in a 
way that helps the African-American community. 
The problem with the view of the death penalty as a legitimate public 
commodity is that the sanction has no such status, and there is no chance 
that the Court can make it qualify. The legitimate-public-commodity 
perspective represents an idealized view of the death penalty that has little 
connection to reality. Supreme Court regulation over the last fifty years 
has failed to bring about either a selection system that distributes death 
sentences with adequate fairness or the regularity to provide legitimate 
desert and deterrence outcomes.436 The best we can say is that the Court’s 
death-penalty regulation has contributed to some reduction in the 
influence of racism but also to the dwindling use of the sanction, which, 
in turn, demonstrates how well states can get along without it.437 We 
should not imagine that the Court can now suddenly encourage a fair 
“leveling up” so that many more black-victim murderers receive the 
penalty. There is no workable methodology to bring about such a result.438 
A refusal to partially abolish capital punishment based on such a claim is 
not a better way to respect African Americans. 
A separate group of critics, however, might emphasize that the death 
penalty is already crumbling to deny that substantial abolition would 
adequately honor African Americans. Those critics might contend that, 
even if the Court does not abolish the sanction for aggravated murder, 
states will continue to abandon it. If states would all soon abandon it 
anyway, the critics might contend, Court-imposed abolition would have 
minimal meaning in the lives of African Americans or their supporters. 
The principal answer to this argument is that, as Kimberlé Crenshaw 
has explained, symbolism matters in the effort to dismantle the racial 
hierarchy.439 She has noted that “much of what characterized Black 
oppression” during the Jim Crow era “was symbolic and formal,” and the 
                                                   
Alan Blinder & Kevin Sack, Charleston Church Killer is Sentenced to Death, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 
2017, at A1. 
436. The modern effort can be understood to have started, although modestly, with Witherspoon v. 
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). In that case, the Court rejected the Illinois approach to exclusion of 
capital jurors for mere qualms about the death penalty as overbroad under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. See id. at 518–23. The decision “had the effect of vacating many existing death 
sentences . . . although many of these would be reimposed after new sentencing hearings.” STUART 
BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 254 (2002). 
437. See supra notes 424–432 and accompanying text. 
438. See Howe, supra note 382, at 2132–35 (explaining that leveling up is infeasible because of 
lack of control over the main arbiters in capital selection—prosecutors and juries). 
439. See Crenshaw, supra note 416, at 1378. 
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elimination of those signs of subjugation (“Whites Only”) were important 
even though that was woefully insufficient to bring about equality.440 The 
racially discriminatory use of the death sanction is a denial of African 
Americans’ “equal status under the law.”441 While the Supreme Court has 
worked to make capital selection less racialized, the key to appreciating 
what Court abolition could symbolize is to recognize that the death 
penalty, as an institution, remains to those familiar with its heritage a 
symbol of white supremacy.442 The Court need only lay out the connection 
between the sanction and our history of racial subjugation to further 
emphasize that meaning when abolishing the death penalty. Moreover, 
before the death penalty for aggravated murder dwindles even more 
significantly,443 the Court could pursue the synergistic symbolism that 
would come with simultaneous abolition of the sanction and robust 
atonement for Dred Scott and Plessy.444 
V. IMPLEMENTING THE PLAN AS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
In this Part, this Article proposes a way for the Supreme Court to pursue 
robust atonement for Dred Scott and Plessy through substantial abolition 
of capital punishment. This Part first describes an approach for 
constructing constitutional meaning by which the Court could justify 
substantial abolition. This Part then proposes how the Court in the process 
could strive for expiation. 
A. Combining Clauses to Justify Substantial Abolition 
As a matter of constitutional law, substantial abolition of capital 
punishment could rest on an interpretive approach that is novel in the 
                                                   
440. Id. 
441. Cholbi & Madva, supra note 422, at 518. 
442. See JACKSON, supra note 27, at 78 (“‘The death penalty’ says Bryan Stevenson, Director of 
the Alabama Equal Justice Initiative, ‘symbolizes whom we fear and don’t fear, whom we care about 
and whose lives are not valid.’”). 
443. As Carol and Jordan Steiker have noted, truly nationwide abolition of the death penalty is 
unlikely to occur soon except through a Supreme Court ruling grounded on the Constitution. See 
STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 11, at 256–58. This seems true as well regarding the application of 
the sanction to aggravated murder. However, the use of the penalty may continue to dwindle. 
444. Using partial abolition as the context for atonement would also allow the Court to avoid 
focusing on the more controversial aspects of deciding what equality means. Because our history of 
white hegemony has disadvantaged African Americans to the benefit of whites, it is debatable how to 
apply the Constitution to promote equality. Is the Constitution colorblind or does it allow actions to 
counter the historical subjugation of African Americans? See Harris, supra note 51, at 222 
(“Colorblind equality, like ‘separate but equal’ renders racial inequality virtually irremediable.”). 
Abolishing the death penalty for aggravated murder does not implicate that problem. Abolition would 
ensure that the death penalty is not used to deprive African Americans of equal status under the law. 
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death-penalty context but that the Court has used in other areas: 
combining constitutional clauses.445 In the death penalty context, the 
Court could aggregate the equal protection mandate and the prohibition 
on cruel and unusual punishments. Support exists for this approach from 
a variety of Court decisions outside of the death-penalty arena, including 
several that overturned laws promoting discrimination based on race and 
sexual orientation.446 This clause-aggregation methodology would also 
solve some central problems that the Court has noted as reasons not to 
substantially restrict the use of the death penalty under a single-
clause methodology.447 
1. Precedents for Clause Aggregation 
In several cases, the Supreme Court has aggregated constitutional 
clauses to create new fundamental rights.448 While the most prominent, 
recent endorsement of clause combination came in the Obergefell 
decision finding a right to same-sex marriage,449 the Court has used the 
methodology in varied contexts, including to support rights of criminal 
defendants.450 For example, the Court has combined the ideals of due 
process and equal protection to ensure effective access by indigent, 
criminal defendants to appellate courts.451 Likewise, the Court has 
                                                   
445. See supra notes 28–33 and accompanying text. 
446. See infra notes 448–464 and accompanying text. 
447. See infra notes 465–481 and accompanying text. 
448.  See generally Howe, supra note 28, at 830–44 (discussing various Supreme Court decisions 
that employed rights-based clause aggregation). 
449. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.   
450. Perhaps the most famous example of transparent clause aggregation occurred in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where the Court recognized a right of married couples to use 
contraception. See id. at 484–86. Justice Douglas, for the majority, identified the right in the safeguard 
for “privacy surrounding the marriage relationship” created by “penumbras[] formed by emanations” 
from the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments. Id. Griswold has been severely criticized, 
among other reasons, for failing adequately to explain “how a series of specified rights combined to 
create a new and unspecified right.” Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 9 (1971); see also Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The “New” Substantive Due Process 
and the Democratic Ethic: A Prolegomenon, 1976 BYU L. REV. 43, 84 (1976) (criticizing Griswold 
on similar grounds). For the view, however, that the Griswold approach actually had “legitimacy and 
vitality,” see Stephen Kanter, The Griswold Diagrams: Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional 
Rights, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 624 (2006). 
451. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356–58 (1963) (citing the ideals of due process and 
equal protection together to reject state requirement that indigent, criminal defendants pay for their 
counsel on appeals of right); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (relying on combination of 
Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause to reject state requirement that indigent, criminal 
defendants pay for their trial transcripts as a condition of appeal); see also Halbert v. Michigan, 545 
U.S. 605, 610 (2005) (declaring that the Court’s earlier decisions regarding indigent access to appeals 
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combined rights to freedom “of speech and press” and rights to “privacy” 
(each also based on multiple clauses) to support a right to be free from 
criminal prosecution for private, home viewing of obscene 
pornography.452 In addition, the Court has relied on both due process and 
equal protection concerns to find a right to be free of criminal prosecution 
for engaging in intimate sexual contact with a person of the same sex.453 
The Court also has used clause aggregation to reject some of its old 
decisions that, along with Dred Scott and Plessy, supported the racial 
hierarchy.454 An example is Loving v. Virginia,455 which, as we have seen, 
struck down Virginia miscegenation statutes that criminalized interracial 
marriage and that also rejected the old Pace decision that had upheld 
racially-discriminatory laws criminalizing adultery.456 In Loving, the 
Court declared that the miscegenation statutes were “so directly 
subversive of the principle of equality” as to “deprive all the State’s 
citizens of liberty without due process of law.”457 That declaration hinted 
of clause aggregation, and, in Obergefell, the Court looked back at Loving 
and declared that the “dynamic” that resulted from the “interrelation of 
the two principles” helped explain the holding.458 
Clause combination at times also has helped members of the Court who 
favor originalism acknowledge new rights. For example, in the Dale 
case,459 the Court combined the right of free expression and the right of 
                                                   
reflect “both equal protection and due process concerns”); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996) 
(“We observe . . . that the Court’s decisions concerning access to judicial processes, commencing 
with Griffin . . . reflect both equal protection and due process concerns.”); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 
U.S. 660, 665 (1983) (declaring that principles from the two clauses “converge[d]” in the “analysis 
[of] these cases”); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608–09 (1974) (declaring that the explanation for 
Griffin and Douglas was clause combination, “some support being derived from the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and some from the Due Process Clause of that Amendment”). 
452. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). See also Howe, supra note 28, at 838 
(discussing the clause aggregation employed in Stanley). 
453. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (asserting that Lawrence 
“drew upon principles of liberty and equality to define and protect . . . rights of gays and lesbians”); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575–79 (2003). 
454. An example of such a decision, based on both notions of liberty and equality, and thus, due 
process and equal protection, is Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666–70 (1966), 
where the Court rejected a state poll tax of $1.50; see also Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 
316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating under both notions a law that allowed sterilization of habitual 
criminals). For more on Harper and its effective undermining of the Williams decision that came two 
years after Plessy, see supra notes 249–255 and accompanying text. 
455. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
456. See supra notes 151–152 and accompanying text. 
457. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
458. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603. 
459. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647 (2000) (recognizing a freedom of 
expressive association). 
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association to acknowledge a right of “expressive association” that 
enabled the Boy Scouts to exclude gay men from membership.460 “The 
most originalist-oriented Justices, Thomas and Scalia, joined Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court without expressed concern that it was 
anti-originalist.”461 Their willingness to endorse the clause-aggregation 
methodology to reach a desired outcome is, perhaps, not surprising.462 
Rights-based clause combination parallels other traditional strategies that 
the Court has employed in giving meaning to the Constitution, such as 
focusing on structure or on the restraining effect of one clause 
on  another.463 
In the end, cases in which the Court has used clause combination 
outside of the death-penalty context can support the use of the approach 
to substantially abolish the death penalty. Commentators have noted that 
the methodology is under-theorized in the Court’s jurisprudence; the 
justices have chosen to employ the approach in some circumstances and 
not others, and the explanations for those choices do not appear in the 
Court’s opinions.464 Nonetheless, nothing about abolition of the death 
penalty for aggravated murder makes the application of a clause-
combination rationale improper. 
                                                   
460. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
461. Howe, supra note 28, at 879. 
462. We should recognize, moreover, that any claim that there is an original meaning of the Equal 
Protection Clause or of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause that would prevent their 
combination to substantially abolish the death penalty would be an alternative form of creative 
construction. There is no consensus that either clause has a well-defined, original meaning. See, e.g., 
Mark V. Tushnet, Equal Protection, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 297, 297 (Kermit Hall ed., 2d ed. 2005) (concerning the Equal Protection Clause); 
Scott W. Howe, Furman’s Mythical Mandate, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 435, 461 (2007) (concerning 
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause). 
463. See Michael Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1095–101 
(2016) (contending that “combination analysis shares significant functional features with two widely 
utilized tools of constitutional decisionmaking: namely, the constitutional avoidance canon and 
arguments based on constitutional structure”). 
464. See, e.g., Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights, VA. PUB. 
L. & LEGAL THEORY, at 26–27 (Research Paper No. 42, 2016) (discussing the idea of 
“intersectional[ity]” between clauses but noting that in Obergefell, the Court “did not . . . define what 
the intersectional right consists in”); Howe, supra note 28, at 854–56 (concluding that “the Court 
chooses when to employ clause aggregation from among the cases where it is plausibly employed, 
and the factors that influence that choice are unspoken by the Court and typically non-evident to the 
observer”); Kanter, supra note 450, at 624 (noting that the use of clause aggregation in Griswold “was 
rather vaguely and poorly explained”). 
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2. The Benefits of Clause Combination 
The modern death penalty embodies two related problems that unite in 
revealing its heritage in the ignominious quest for white supremacy. First, 
racism still infects capital punishment where it survives, as proven most 
directly by the many studies showing the racialized distribution of death 
sentences, but also by the punishment’s geographical correlation with the 
historical use of racial-hatred lynchings.465 Second, increasing public 
concerns over inequality and unfairness have contributed to a growing 
societal resistance to the use of capital punishment, a development that 
has progressively undermined the penological rationales for the sanction 
and underscored, again, that a more sinister rationale probably helps 
explain its survival.466 The Court has concluded that the racial-disparity 
problem is inadequate to make out a constitutional violation without 
proving a racially-discriminatory purpose,467 which is rarely possible.468 
Likewise, the Court has indicated that the dwindling-use concern makes 
out no constitutional violation at least until the sanction becomes so 
substantially rejected across the nation that the Court can conclude that a 
societal consensus has developed against it.469 Yet the racialized-
distribution problem and the dwindling-use problem together reveal a 
more profound infirmity regarding the modern death penalty: it would 
doubtfully exist as a punishment for aggravated murder absent a 
longstanding wrong (the racial hierarchy) that the Court wrongfully 
endorsed in Dred Scott and Plessy.470 
Clause combination would empower the Court to substantially reject 
the death penalty based on this larger infirmity. According to the Court, 
neither the Equal Protection Clause nor the Cruel and Unusual 
                                                   
465. See supra notes 373–413 and accompanying text. 
466. See supra notes 414–432 and accompanying text. 
467. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment 
required proof from the petitioner “that the decisionmaker[] in his case acted with discriminatory 
purpose”); id. at 308 (asserting that, since Georgia’s death-penalty system complied with the Court’s 
precedents on capital-selection, “we lawfully may presume” that his death sentence did not violate 
the Eighth Amendment). 
468. See John Charles Boger, McCleskey v. Kemp: Field Notes from 1977–1991, 112 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1637, 1678 (2018) (“McCleskey effectively closed the book, not only on further racial challenges 
in capital sentencing but, far more broadly, on empirical racial challenges in other kinds of criminal 
cases.”); Paul Butler, Equal Protection and White Supremacy, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1457, 1461 (2018) 
(describing the challenge of proving discrimination as “really difficult” although not “impossible”).   
469. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 579–81 (2005) (finding objective evidence in 
support of a societal consensus against the use of capital punishment for juvenile offenders); CARTER 
ET AL., supra note 379, at 37–39 (describing the Court’s application of this test).  
470. See supra notes 402–404 and accompanying text. 
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Punishments Clause individually can justify substantial abolition.471 Yet 
clause combination can enable the Court to justify protections that neither 
clause alone could support,472 and the concerns of each of those two 
clauses are heavily implicated by the institution of capital punishment.473 
We could plausibly conclude that the racial-disparities problem goes far 
toward revealing an equal-protection violation. Likewise, we could 
plausibly conclude that the dwindling-use problem almost reveals the 
violation of a societal consensus and thus, the Eighth Amendment. 
Further, the related implication that the wrongful quest to maintain white 
supremacy helped capital punishment survive (and vice versa) gives 
reason to combine some of the force from each of the clauses and reject 
the sanction for aggravated murder.474 Because of the iniquity of states’ 
efforts to subjugate African Americans and of Dred Scott and Plessy, the 
Court would properly resolve uncertainty over whether capital 
punishment would have survived had those wrongs never happened in 
favor of abolition. 
The clause-aggregation approach would also avoid additional 
impediments to substantial abolition that would arise under a single-
clause methodology. First, the Court could distinguish, rather than 
overrule, its prior decisions involving systemic challenges to the death 
penalty. The most salient is McCleskey v. Kemp,475 where the Court 
confronted evidence from the Baldus study indicating pronounced racial 
discrimination in the Georgia capital-sentencing system.476 The 
                                                   
471. See supra notes 467–469 and accompanying text. 
472. For a “systemic examination of combination analysis in U.S. constitutional law,” or what I 
call a “clause aggregation” or “clause combination” methodology, see Coenen, supra note 463, at 
1068; see also Ariel Porat & Eric A. Posner, Aggregation and Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2, 48–49 (2012) 
(describing the idea of “hybrid rights” in constitutional law as an instance of “cross-claim normative 
aggregation”). 
473. Michael Coenen contends that it is not insensible to conclude that a law almost violates—or 
only “barely” complies with—the demands of a particular clause. See Coenen, supra note 463, at 
1095. This conclusion, he notes, depends on our “metaphysical picture” of the clauses. See id. “Some 
of us might prefer to compare the clauses to on/off switches, whereas others might prefer to compare 
them to sliding scales.” Id. Yet there is no “right” or “wrong” perspective on the metaphysical 
structure of the clauses; “there are only different metaphors that we may or may not choose to 
employ.” Id. 
474. Combining the force of the two clauses to support partial abolition does not violate any norm 
from the natural order. See id. at 1067 (“Just as my limited desire to see a movie and my limited desire 
to buy clothes might together yield an overwhelming desire to go to the mall, so too might clauses 
providing limited individual support for a judicial result operate together to generate strong collective 
support for th[e] result.” (footnote omitted)).  
475. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
476. See supra notes 385–393 and accompanying text. 
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McCleskey Court analyzed and rejected claims based on that evidence 
brought separately under the Equal Protection and Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clauses.477 However, the Court did not address whether a 
hybrid-clause basis existed to reject the death penalty as a descendant of 
the racial hierarchy. Likewise, the Court’s other decisions in which it has 
rejected calls to abolish or substantially abolish the death penalty have not 
addressed such a claim and are thus, also distinguishable.478 
The complexity of the dual-clause approach would also help allay 
concerns that the ruling might cast constitutional doubts on the larger 
criminal-justice system.479 In McCleskey, Justice Powell, for the majority, 
asserted that “if we accepted McCleskey’s claim . . . we could soon be 
faced with similar claims as to other types of penalty,” and he anticipated 
arguments grounded on “unexplained discrepancies that correlate to 
membership in other minority groups, and even to gender.”480 In dissent, 
Justice Brennan characterized this concern as “a fear of too much 
justice.”481 With the complexities introduced by the dual-clause theory of 
the death penalty’s invalidity, racial or non-racial discrimination 
regarding other criminal penalties is easily differentiated. Imagine, for 
example, a claim challenging a sentence of incarceration and alleging 
gender discrimination in the relative level of use of incarceration as 
opposed to probation. A dual-clause ruling from the Court substantially 
abolishing the death penalty based on our racial history would not apply 
to that problem, if only because incarceration is not dwindling to the point 
of being widely abandoned as a punishment. 
B. Incorporating Confession and Apology 
An opinion substantially abolishing the death penalty based on its 
connection to the quest for white supremacy would allow the Court’s 
justices to effectively pursue institutional expiation for Dred Scott and 
                                                   
477. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292 (addressing the equal protection claim); id. at 308 (addressing 
the Eighth Amendment claim). 
478. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, J., Powell, J. & 
Stevens, J.); id. at 222 (White, J., concurring) (upholding against a facial challenge under the 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments a statute that required a judge or jury to find at least 
one statutory aggravating factor and to consider mitigating evidence before imposing a death sentence 
on a convicted capital offender); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam) 
(concluding that standardless capital sentencing violates the prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishments); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 196 (1971) (rejecting due process challenge to 
standardless capital sentencing).  
479. By adding complexity to the supporting rationale, clause combination can help confine the 
“precedential sweep” of a ruling. Coenen, supra note 463, at 1104. 
480. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 315–17 (footnote omitted). 
481. Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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Plessy. This Article has proposed that there are four important parts to the 
effort: (1) confession of fundamental errors by the Court; (2) confession 
of the associated harms; (3) transparent apology; and (4) concrete action 
to indicate sincerity.482 Substantial abolition of the death penalty would 
satisfy the last requirement.483 Part V also has explained why substantially 
ending capital punishment would provide a relevant context for fulfilling 
the first three requirements.484 Nonetheless, this final section focuses on 
aspects of fulfilling the first two requirements involving confession and 
the third involving transparent apology. 
As for confession of past errors regarding Dred Scott and Plessy, this 
Article urges that the Court not cast those actions as simply the 
questionable products of a bygone era that the Court would not repeat 
today. To express disagreement with those opinions but suggest that they 
were plausible when rendered is to fail to take institutional responsibility 
for them as iniquities. While the current justices obviously did not 
participate in Dred Scott or Plessy, they are in charge of the Court’s 
present ownership of its institutional history. To best fulfill that 
institutional responsibility, the proposal is that the Court identify the 
errors in Dred Scott and Plessy and, without equivocation, characterize 
them as atrocities. 
Regarding confession of the associated harms, this Article advises that 
the Court acknowledge that Dred Scott and Plessy made it complicit in 
the violent degradation of African Americans. This means confessing, 
first, to complicity in general. The Court should admit that it joined forces 
with the white supremacists and became responsible for all of the 
foreseeable consequences of the color-line and the segregation regime. 
Those consequences extended not only to a denial of equal opportunities 
but to the psychic and physical brutality inflicted on African Americans. 
The Court could not describe the full extent of the horrors, but it could 
summarize them. It could also offer some specific instances of the trauma 
inflicted from the perspective of African Americans. In Missouri’s Black 
Heritage, for example, Professor Lorenzo Greene, a distinguished 
African-American historian, described his painfully insulting introduction 
to the white people of Jefferson City, Missouri, in 1933, after arriving by 
train from New York City to join the faculty at Lincoln University.485 
Within minutes, he was called a racial slur, denied a taxi ride, and refused 
                                                   
482. See supra text accompanying note 15.  
483. See supra text accompanying notes 20–27. 
484. See supra Part V. 
485. See GREENE ET AL., supra note 65, at 1–2. 
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service in a restaurant.486 In I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings, Maya 
Angelou described witnessing as a ten-year old in the late 1930s “the most 
painful and confusing experience” she ever had with her grandmother.487 
She watched her “Momma” ordered about and mocked and insulted at her 
store in Stamps, Arkansas, by white children, and saw her confront the 
abuse with equanimity by quietly singing prayerful hymns.488 In Brown v. 
Mississippi,489 the Court itself described the torture of two African-
American men to extract “confessions” that were used to secure their 
death sentences.490 The Brown case also exemplifies the sham capital 
proceedings that descended from the lynchings that were used in the Jim 
Crow era to intimidate African Americans and their supporters. In the 
Equal Justice Initiative’s Report on Lynchings, the authors, led by Bryan 
Stevenson, recount the grisly details of some of the thousands of spectacle 
lynchings against African Americans that occurred during the era of de 
jure segregation.491 A representative example concerns the three-hour, 
torture lynching of Lation Scott (for an alleged “assault”), across from the 
courthouse in Dyersburg, Tennessee, attended by thousands of whites, 
including children. The authors report: “A mob tortured Mr. [Lation] Scott 
with a hot poker iron, gouging out his eyes, shoving the hot poker down 
his throat and pressing it all over his body before castrating him and 
burning him alive over a slow fire.”492 
Regarding apology itself, this Article advocates that it be emphatic and 
unconditional, although institutional. It would be inadequate simply to say 
that Dred Scott and Plessy and the associated harms were “regrettable.” 
There is value in more clearly pursuing redemption through a direct and 
forceful apology. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has presented two principal proposals that interconnect. It 
began by inquiring whether and ultimately finding that the Supreme Court 
should do more to atone for its endorsement of the color-line and de jure 
segregation in Dred Scott and Plessy. The Court will fail adequately to 
pursue expiation until it offers a transparent confession of errors and of 
the associated harms, an institutional apology, and some further action to 
                                                   
486. See id. Professor Greene’s mistreatment occurred only miles from where Dred Scott earlier 
experienced the insult of the Court’s Dred Scott opinion. See supra text accompanying notes 64–73. 
487. MAYA ANGELOU, I KNOW WHY THE CAGED BIRD SINGS 28 (1969). 
488. See id. at 28–33. 
489. 297 U.S. 278, 279–85 (1936). 
490. Id.  
491. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE’S REPORT ON LYNCHING, supra note 20, at 51–68. 
492. Id. at 35. 
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underscore its sincerity. The Article then asked what vehicle the Court 
might use to pursue atonement and concluded that a Court opinion 
substantially abolishing capital punishment would provide an especially 
appropriate context. The sanction is widely understood as tied to a history 
of black subjugation; and, indeed, we cannot refute that capital 
punishment for murder would have disappeared by now but for the 
judicially endorsed quest for white supremacy. Even were the Court not 
to apologize, substantial abolition of the death penalty is justified on that 
basis under a methodology for constructing constitutional meaning that 
combines partial forces from the equal protection mandate and the 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. From that perspective, the 
Article might be understood as primarily an argument for substantial 
abolition of the death penalty and only secondarily as an argument for 
Supreme Court expiation. Yet the Article urges an understanding that 
gives primacy to neither proposal. The larger theme has been that the 
Court might achieve something unusually valuable by pursuing the 
synergistic symbolism that would come with simultaneous restriction of 
the death sanction and robust atonement for the violence of Dred Scott 
and Plessy. 
